Privacy-Preserving Reengineering of Model-View-Controller Application Architectures Using Linked Data

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Abstract

When a legacy system’s software architecture cannot be redesigned, implementing additional privacy requirements is often complex, unreliable and costly to maintain. This paper presents a privacy-by-design approach to reengineer web applications as linked data-enabled and implement access control and privacy preservation properties. The method is based on the knowledge of the application architecture, which for the Web of data is commonly designed on the basis of a model-view-controller pattern. Whereas wrapping techniques commonly used to link data of web applications duplicate the security source code, the new approach allows for the controlled disclosure of an application’s data, while preserving non-functional properties such as privacy preservation. The solution has been implemented and compared with existing linked data frameworks in terms of reliability, maintainability and complexity.

Keywords: Privacy by design, Web of data, Software architecture, Model-View-Controller.

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1 Introduction

In the realm of a software system, confidentiality and privacy are non-functional properties aimed at protecting the system’s information resources. Such properties are especially relevant in the Web of data, largely concerned with procuring web applications that can publicly display their data and information, such that entities from heterogeneous information systems can be connected [20]. Reengineering an existing application for the Web of data must consider how to fulfil privacy preservation properties.

The challenge concerns Privacy by Design (PbD) principles, which consider privacy as an essential property to be considered during the design phase and throughout the entire engineering lifecycle [22]. Engineers have to go beyond functional requirements and be especially responsive to PbD aspects when engineering software artefacts that deal with personal data [4]. Since confidentiality concerns ethical and legal aspects that are beyond the scope of this paper, in the following we focus on the technical aspects related with data privacy preservation of software systems.

Adding non-functional properties, such as privacy preservation, to an already built software system is generally more expensive than taking proper measures while designing its architecture [49]. How expensive it is to take security measures on an existing software system depends on a number of factors, such as: the number, type and scope of security properties; the size and complexity of the information system architecture; and the affordances and constraints of the methods and software technologies used to engineer the reconstruction. Regarding the latter, existing methods to reengineer a legacy application for the Web of data are based on the thorough analysis of the documented specifications, design diagrams and software manuals that describe its architecture [53]. They overlook, however, a first-class element of software architecture and design, which is the source code.

Source code can be used to gain valuable insights about the design and architecture of a legacy web application. The hypothesis of this work is that reengineering for privacy a web application architecture at the level of source code can provide an advantage in terms of reliability and maintainability when obtaining an extended version of the application that considers PbD properties, which might have been overlooked in the original version.

Source code-level interventions to improve an application’s security and privacy are inspired by and framed in the Security by Design (SbD) and PbD principles, which have significant expressions in Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC) and Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP), among other techniques [15].

When it comes to adding PbD protections, it is difficult to imagine a broad-spectrum solution to tame the size, complexity and architectural diversity of web applications. Nonetheless, the large number of web applications based on the Model-View-Controller (MVC) pattern architecture and its derivatives [8] is a Pareto argument in favor of limiting the scope. Therefore, it is reasonable to focus on MVC-based applications in the Web of data as the target application architectures that can be hopefully reengineered.

The realm of such applications has to be focused in software technologies that have been successfully used to publish data and information resources in the Web of data. In this vein, Linked Data (LD) methods have proven as useful to prepare web applications with standard vocabularies and schemata in order to publish and link the application data and resources [23]. Best practices for publishing linked data define how data can be published and linked by means of standard technologies such as RDF and JSON-LD. Providing an existing application with such capabilities encompasses to define a metadata schema, to compile and link the application data, and to provide an Application Programming Interface (API) that enable third parties to browse the application resources based on public metadata [18]. Numerous semantic methods and software frameworks have been used to engineer LD-enabled versions of web applications and information systems [53]. Recently, PbD and privacy preservation are prevalent concerns in the LD research field [27].

Our contribution is a new PbD approach based on LD technologies, used to reengineer MVC-based web applications that improve reliability and maintainability as relevant quality features in the reengineered application, after incorporating the confidentiality and data privacy preservation requirements.

To investigate the former hypothesis, we have followed a design-and-creation information systems research methodology [35]. It involves the steps of awareness, suggestion, development, evaluation and conclusion [52], which constitute the structure of the rest of the paper. After PbD issues are described in Section 2 as part of the awareness step, Section 3 analyzes the existing LD architectures and frameworks in order to suggest the reengineering for privacy PbD strategy. At the end of the suggestion step, we propose a first contribution, consisting in an original classification of current LD reengineering strategies. Section 4 develops, as the main contribution, a general linked data reengineering framework, named EasyData, which is applied to provide legacy MVC-based web applications with privacy preservation properties. Section 5 includes the evaluation of EasyData against other
comparable frameworks, along with a discussion of the research results and their limitations. Finally, Section 6 presents some conclusions and future lines of research.

2 Data Privacy by Design

When data about individuals are involved, special care must be taken to avoid privacy violations. Data privacy by design [6] implies that sanitization approaches, based on removing identifiers, are not enough to preserve individuals’ privacy, because certain combinations of non-identifying personal data, known as quasi-identifiers (QI) [9], may be linked with other information sources to re-identify them [44]. Nowadays, the amount of available information and data sources along with the increasing computational power facilitate to conduct such re-identifications. Because re-identification constitutes a real privacy threat and the protection of individuals’ privacy is a fundamental right, legal regulations [14, 51] have set out the need for adequately protecting personally identifiable information (PII) [34], which is any information about an individual that can be used to distinguish or trace her identity (e.g., name or birth date) and any other information that is linked or linkable to her identity (e.g., medical, educational, financial and employment data).

To secure PII confidentiality, PPDP techniques are used that generate a transformed version of data that changes the PII it contains, while at the same time offering data that is valid for statistical analysis [21]. In order to address the current obligations for PII protection and, thus, offer ex ante privacy guarantees against identity disclosure, the design of a web application that publishes individuals’ data (e.g. a healthcare company web application used by their clients) must consider the diversity of PbD methods and techniques as a first-class requirement. Data privacy preservation can be implemented in legacy web applications when transforming their architecture to a LD-enabled one. This usually involves extending the legacy application with added middleware components [19], which have to duplicate the implementation of diverse non-functional properties like security. A lot of LD techniques and software tools exist to map relational data sources [48], interlinking datasets [54] and exposing LD APIs as middleware [17]. As for the general software systems, these approaches have proven costly and not absent of significant risk [27,53].
2.1 A Motivating Example

Despite the policies that legally regulate the use of web data sources [6], and in spite of the fact that data items must be anonymized before publishing an application’s data, one cannot impede someone from knowing sensitive information [40]. This is especially worrisome in the light of linked data applications.

For instance, let’s suppose $DS_1$ is the dataset of a tax registry web source, having the attributes $address$, $birthdate$, $sex$, $postcode$, $name$ and $taxes$; and $DS_2$ is the dataset from another web source to consult energy consumption, containing the attributes $birthdate$, $sex$, $postcode$, $electricityConsumption$ and $gasConsumption$. Even removing explicit identifiers, an individual’s $name$ in $DS_1$ can be linked with another record in $DS_2$ through the combination of $postcode$, $birthdate$ and $sex$ attributes. Each attribute value does not uniquely identify a record owner, but linking data from both applications forms a QI that might point to a unique or small number of records. The attacker can thus notice that one house at a certain address might be unoccupied because its $electricity$ and $gas$ consumption are almost nil. This can pose a threat about burglary, but it can be also a tool for tax agencies to investigate occupied rental houses that might have unpaid taxes from the lessor.

Even anonymizing the combination of datasets by means of generalization techniques on the QIs, there is a possibility that QIs are split in two datasets after linking them for a given analysis. For instance, let the $DS_1$ schema be $(userId, sex, postalAddress, defaultRisk)$, and let $DS_2$ schema be $(userId, occupation, defaultRisk, electricityConsumption, gasConsumption)$, as shown in Table 1. Assuming that a data analyst needs to combine $DS_1$ and $DS_2$ to predict, let’s say, the risk of finance default, then $DS_1$ and $DS_2$ can be linked and merged by matching the $userId$ field in a new dataset $DS$ that is then anonymized. Then the sex and occupation attributes form a new QI, which was not included in each dataset separately, so a linking attack is still possible on such fields of $DS$. After integrating the tables of both datasets, the $(Female, Carpenter)$ individual on the $(sex, occupation)$ attribute pair becomes unique and vulnerable to link sensitive information, such as $postalAddress$ and $energyConsumption$.

Because the ultimate motivation of data releasing is to conduct data-driven analyses, sanitizing and anonymization should be done in a way that the protected data still retain as much analytical utility as possible; that is, the conclusions extracted from the analysis of the anonymized dataset should be
Table 1  Linked data items of an example linking the datasets from a tax registry application and an energy consumption application

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>userId</th>
<th>default</th>
<th>postal</th>
<th>risk</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>occupation</th>
<th>electricity</th>
<th>gas</th>
<th>Consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1–3</td>
<td>0y3n</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4–7</td>
<td>0y4n</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>A2</td>
<td>Ceramist</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8–12</td>
<td>2y3n</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td>Plumber</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13–16</td>
<td>3y1n</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>A4</td>
<td>Webmaster</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17–22</td>
<td>4y2n</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>A5</td>
<td>Animator</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23–25</td>
<td>3y0n</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>A6</td>
<td>Animator</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26–28</td>
<td>3y0n</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>A7</td>
<td>Carver</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29–31</td>
<td>3y0n</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>A8</td>
<td>Carver</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32–33</td>
<td>2y0n</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>A9</td>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>1y0n</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>A10</td>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar to those of the original dataset. With the goal of balancing privacy and utility preservation, PPDP methods [15] have been used to sanitize published datasets by modifying the original QI attributes while preserving certain statistical features.

2.2 Reengineering for Privacy Preservation

Different privacy models can be considered to define the sanitizing conditions. One of the most widely used anonymization models is $k$-anonymity [21]. The idea underlying $k$-anonymity [45] is to homogenize the QI attributes to make them indistinguishable in groups of at least $k$ records, thus limiting to $1/k$ the probability of re-identification. Two distortion methods can be used to enforce $k$-anonymity, i.e. generalization and microaggregation. The generalization method [45] homogenizes the quasi-identifiers with the most specific superclass of the $k$-record group, while the microaggregation method [32] homogenizes the quasi-identifiers with the average of the $k$-record group. In previous works, PPDP methods have been improved to exploit the semantics of nominal values and replace them by concepts in an ontology [41, 42].

All these are semantic privacy-preserving techniques that, usefully implemented into a linked data application, facilitate the fulfillment of privacy properties. The issue here is how to engineer privacy properties into an existing web application, i.e. reengineering for privacy preservation. For instance, let’s consider for the first example of the previous section the development of a privacy-preserving version that follows a layered security architecture [50]. The security controls are usually implemented on top of the data model to
provide linked versions of user identifiers and other PII, potentially QIs, such as postcode, birthdate and sex. Implementing a new controller operation to link a user ID with its PII, however, might impose a restriction related with data privacy. The logic for the $k$-anonymity privacy preservation model, for instance, is normally implemented in the controller component. To be fair, it should be duplicated in the database mapping code as well as in the database stored procedures. Code duplication in different architectural layers overly reduces the reusability and maintainability of an application. Implementing the privacy restrictions only at one layer can pose a design-level impediment, since third party applications (e.g. a mobile app) do not necessarily access to the same controller components. Therefore, some browsers might overlook the data privacy-preserving controls. In general, duplicating the controller logic to implement changeable security properties is not a good practice.

3 Reengineering MVC-based Applications

The redesign of a web application to include SbD or PbD properties is more expensive than considering such requirements from scratch, but often it is unavoidable. Regular web applications’ architecture can be tackled at any of the three layers of the MVC pattern, namely the data binding model, the web view and the controller logic. Interventions at the view level, known as web scraping or harvesting, consist in directly accessing the application HTTP interface to extract the data that is published as HTML. It usually requires some type of license agreement with the application owner, but the discussion on this is out of scope of our research. Therefore, we constrain the discussion to the controller and data binding layers of the MVC architecture.

Confidentiality requirements, such as access authorization or privacy preservation, are often implemented as part of the application business logic. Web applications are not usually designed to implement their business logic in the data layer (for instance, as stored procedures of the database), but in intermediate controller components instead. The controller and data binding components of an existing MVC application have been largely explored as alternative points where to provide data access [5, 10, 17]. Security requirements can be implemented in the controller layer, as some frameworks do—e.g. Spring Security\footnote{https://spring.io/projects/spring-security} maps permissions and access authorizations to each controller function. On the other hand, we can grant RBAC permissions over an application’s data at the data binding or the database level. Then,
new controller operations that need to access and render model data will not be protected against unauthorized access. For instance, consider that mobile apps usually include a separate controller layer implementation in the overall architecture. Access control code has to be duplicated in the potentially multiple implementations of controllers, as well as in the data binding layer or even in the database logic. For layered security requirements, RBAC grants and permissioned stored procedures should be implemented also in the database, which might be a source of code duplication. In sum, SbD and PbD are concerns that involve the overall MVC architecture of the application.

3.1 Analysis of Linked Data Architectures and Frameworks

The architecture of linked data applications or Linked Data Application Architecture (LDAA) is a means to structure the components a LD software system comprises [19]. An extension to the LDAA has been implemented upon a linked data API layer [17] on top of a data access layer (see Figure 1) to mediate between consumer applications and the data sources. As described in [19], the most widespread LDAA is the crawling pattern, which is suitable for implementing linked data applications over a growing set of resources that are crawled and discovered. On the top layer, the crawling architecture has a pipeline of modules, i.e. web access, vocabulary mapping, identity resolution and quality evaluation. An RDF API or SPARQL endpoint is served by such modules, which form the data access, integration and storage layer.

Pipelining all the functional modules of the data access and integration layer eventually leads to the integrated database, which feeds the SPARQL endpoint or API mediator module. In the bottom, the publication layer usually implements wrapper modules that, either by web scraping [38] or enriching [26], add semantics to existing resources and data. Setting up a middleware module is a common strategy to reengineer existing sources, which can range from HTML pages to structured data to web APIs [36]. Other approaches harvest semi-structured HTML content and automatically convert it into structured linked data instances [29]. Scraping and data wrapping techniques either convert data to linked data or provide an API to access data [23].

Thanks to an LD framework, reengineering of a legacy application can be implemented at the data binding model, the web view or the controller layers of its MVC architecture. Next, we analyze where in the MVC layers each framework operates.
Figure 1 Extension to the original LDAA [19] with additional functions for the data, integration and storage layers [17].

- Apache Stanbol, KIM and SDArch [26] are examples of semantic enriching procedures that operate at the view level.
- The D2RQ server [5], Triplify [3] and Virtuoso RDF Views [12] are useful approaches to build wrappers at the data binding level. ActiveRDF can be used to align an application Object-Relational Mapping (ORM) component with a given RDF schema [37].
- Middleware implementations, such as Virtuoso sponger [13] and Pubby, work at the controller level. Hydra [28] is a middleware implementation that also provides clients with JSON-LD descriptions of a new vocabulary, able to express common concepts of Web APIs. Other solutions,
such as the Datalift platform [46] rely upon existing tools such as Silk [24] to provide interlinked RDF datasets.

3.2 LDAA Reengineering Strategy

Reengineering an MVC-based application at the source code level can be an advantage to provide a reliable and maintainable extension that incorporates additional properties. Clearly, this approach becomes feasible as long as the application source code is available. It has also some constraints and limitations that will be discussed later.

Before articulating the suggestion phase of the research methodology, we have participated in the development of linked open data systems for a number of disciplines, such as Information Science (IS) [25] and Software Process Management (SPM) [43], in which we used the LD tools and frameworks analyzed above. As a consequence, a number of methodological and practical considerations for LDAA reengineering have emerged and influenced the proposed methodology.

4 Proposed Methodology for LDAA Reengineering

We have defined a LDAA reengineering methodology that considers a number of application features, in order to decide the applicable reengineering practices. Such features are: (i) the availability of source code, (ii) the provision of APIs or built-in information exposure services, and (iii) the concealment level for enclosed data. The effort required by the reengineering practices range from a seamless API-based integration of LD-enabled applications, to costly adaptions for those that might not use machine-friendly data formats and protocols. The reengineering methodology is graphically summarized in Figure 2.

4.1 Reengineering Methodology

The methodological aspects have to consider the application architecture. In this vein, the reengineering strategies have been classified as scraping, wrapping, and extension, as depicted to Figure 3. Such strategies can be applied either at the data level or the API level. The following classification is considered as a first contribution of the paper, emerging from a thorough analysis of existing LD frameworks and the prior experience using them to build LD-enabled applications.
• **LDAA data scraping** [26,38]: This strategy applies if the web application source code and internal data storage are not available at all, probably because the application was not initially designed for third-party reusing. Information retrieval, web scraping and harvesting techniques are the practicable reengineering alternatives.

• **LDAA data wrapping** [3, 5, 12, 46]: Sometimes the application’s source code is not available, but data is available in an open format. Then, adapters or data wrappers can transform LD requests into queries to the application data storage. Depending on the kind of storage, queries can be issued to database systems, structured files or any other data storage system used by the application.

• **LDAA API wrapping** [1, 2, 10]: This is a practical choice when the application already provides an external API for reusing data and information. Then a proxy, wrapper or middleware component is implemented, so that LD requests are formatted for the API and issued
forth and back. The wrapper or middleware can implement some data transformations and adaptations on top of the original API operations.

- **LDAA API extension**: If the application does not provide an external API, but its source code is available, a software add-on can be implemented to provide the LD API. In this case, data and business models can be discovered from source code analysis of the MVC implementation. On one hand, if applied at the model layer, the extension strategy generates a LD schema from the internal data model implementation. The schema and data instances can be revealed through an external API. The local namespace for the schema generated in this way can initially reflect the application’s internal data model. Yet it can be aligned with standard LD vocabularies through user-defined configurations before publishing, as in the LDAA data wrapping case. On the other hand, if applied at the controller level, the API extension strategy can use the existing implementation in order to avoid code duplication. Extending the API does not consist only in wrapping the existing controller implementation (i.e., the internal API) to make it public as a functionally equivalent API, because the external API requirements might not coincide with the internal one’s.
The LDAA API extension strategy makes it easier to implement extended features as part of an enriched API. This is an opportunity to include a set of additional, either functional or non-functional features. For instance, the internal API of a legacy application can implement some finder methods that return all objects of a given type. The external API, however, may require to define additional findBy methods that return only the objects that fulfill a given filtering condition. The latter is simply a functional extension of the existing API. On the other hand, different security privileges can be granted for the find and findBy methods, or for diverse executions of the same method, depending on the calling user’s role. Even the data output from a method call can be sanitized after applying a custom PPDP policy. In the following we will focus on how our LDAA extension strategy is developed to include such privacy preservation properties.

4.2 Privacy-preserving LDAA Extension

Whereas data scraping and wrapping techniques are commonly used to add semantics to existing web applications, we propose a new extension approach that can be used to expose the internal structure and data model of a legacy app as linked data in a controlled and privacy-preserving way.

EasyData is the name of a new LDAA extension approach to reengineer legacy MVC-based web applications so as to provide them with additional non-functional properties. It has been used to implement privacy preservation requirements as a type of security property. The reengineering cycle consists of a number of functional steps, which can be mapped to regular LDAA modules [17] as explained next.

1. Revealing the underlying application data model: A linked data model equivalent to the application ORM schema is generated and published as RDF. In addition, upon a web application’s request, RDFa and microdata annotations are generated and embedded into the response HTML view. To facilitate external linking with standard vocabularies, metadata mappings can be configured. In this stage, the functionalities of the LDAA web access and vocabulary mapping modules are developed.

2. Linking the application data instances: The linked datasets retrieved from the application’s internal data storage can be processed and linked. Internal data items can be directly linked. Afterwards, an external interlinking module can be used to link external resources [54]. A complementary study on how interlinking tools can help data publishers to connect their resources to the Web of data can be found elsewhere [39].
In combination with a proper interlinking tool, this phase develops the functionalities of the LDAA identity resolution module.

3. **Controlling** the target non-functional quality properties for the application. Considering the scope of our work, security and privacy preservation of data and information resources are such quality aspects. In this phase, the PPDP techniques described above can be seamlessly applied for each published data item and data type. This phase is part of the LDAA quality evaluation.

### 4.3 Implementing the PbD Interventions

Two different prototypes have been implemented to illustrate and test the EasyData LDAA extension strategy. Each prototype enables the procedure to be applied with two different development languages and open source frameworks, which underpin the architecture of a considerable number of MVC-based web applications. The first is a ruby gem\(^2\) used to reengineer ruby-on-rails web applications following the LDAA extension strategy; the second is a python add-on\(^3\) used to deliver LDAA extensions of applications built with the Django framework.

Next, we show how the steps of the EasyData reengineering strategy can be performed using one of the EasyData implementation tools. The Redmine\(^4\) open source project management application is used as a frame example to illustrate how the process can be carried out on a legacy web application.

#### 4.3.1 Revealing the Application Data Model

The first step is to generate and publish an RDF model equivalent to the application’s data model. A simplified schema of Redmine data is formed by the `Project`, `Issue`, `User` and `TimeEntry` classes, as illustrated in the Rails implementation of Figure 4. EasyData can render the RDF model from the web application source code, as shown in Figure 4. The `set_rdf_model_name` configuration option defines the alignment of the application data model elements with concepts and properties of a standard RDF schema. In this example, the Redmine `Project` objects are mapped to DOAP `projects`, the Redmine `User` objects are mapped to FOAF `persons`, and the Redmine `TimeEntry` objects are mapped to OWL-Time `durations`. Redmine `Issue`
Namespace.register(
  :doap, "http://usefulinc.com/ns/doap#")
Namespace.register(
  :foaf, "http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
Namespace.register(
  :time, "http://www.w3.org/2006/time#")
class Project < ActiveRecord::Base
  has_many :issues
  set_rdf_model_name "doap:Project"
end
class Issue < ActiveRecord::Base
  @status = IssueStatus::OPEN
  belongs_to :project
  set_rdf_model_name "xmlns:Issue"
end
class TimeEntry < ActiveRecord::Base
  @spent = 0
  set_rdf_model_name "time:DurationDescription"
end
class ProjectTimeEntry < TimeEntry
  set_rdf_property_name "xmlns:MemberFor"
end
class IssueTimeEntry < TimeEntry
  set_rdf_property_name "xmlns:AssignedFor"
end
class User < ActiveRecord::Base
  has_many :projects,
    :through => :projectTimeEntries
  has_many :issues,
    :through => :issueTimeEntries
  set_rdf_model_name "foaf:Person"
end

Figure 4  Specifying an application’s data model with EasyData in the Ruby implementation of Model components.

objects are not mapped to elements from an external vocabulary, since programmers could not find a standard vocabulary defining what a tracking issue is.

4.3.2 Linking Application Data Instances
External linking targets can be added to the application by means of template tags. Instead of linking to the inner application model entities revealed in the previous step, the application view can be provided with links to other entities discovered by an external interlinking tool. For example, an interlinking process configured to match the Redmine data revealed by EasyData with a DBPedia dataset can map Redmine’s Project with DBPedia’s Project
resource type, Issue with DBPedia’s Issue_tracking_system and User with DBPedia’s User_(computing). EasyData template tags can be used to include links to such DBPedia entities to configure this mapping.

4.3.3 Controlling Authorized Access
This is the first part of the controlling phase, which is applied twice: one for security access control and another for privacy preservation. Access control grants can be configured for data items, data types and service operations generated in the previous steps. Figure 5 is an example of how the MVC controllers are configured with the has_permission_on and filter_access_to options. That permits access to Project and Issue resources as well as the getIssues and getAssignedIssues operations in a Redmine instance. The example defines access permissions for specific user roles (e.g., admin and analyst) and operations (e.g., create, read, update and delete). Note that this security configuration is a simple extension of the available Rails configuration and does not need to be repeated elsewhere in external LD wrappers, thus reducing the dispensable code smells.

4.3.4 Controlling Data Privacy Preservation
This is the second part of the controlling phase, aimed at privacy-preserving data publishing. The datasets retrieved from the web application database can be configured to be sanitized before release, thereby offering privacy guarantees against identity disclosure. The guarantees are achieved in the example by setting certain privacy requirements to yield \(k\)-anonymous datasets. Figure 6 shows an example of how the MVC controllers are configured with new sanitizing rules and queries. The \(k\)-anonymity symbol defined in Ruby specifies the PPDP method that yields \(k\)-anonymous the data records from a query, with generalize and microaggregate the available value options. The \(k\_arg\) option specifies the desired value of \(k\), which determines the privacy degree of the resulting data records. The higher the \(k\), the higher the privacy degree of the result, but the lower its analytic utility will be. Finally, the set of QI attributes to be sanitized is defined with the quasi_id option.

The example defines a configuration to sanitize the output data records from the getAssignedIssues\(^5\) controller function, which has also an access

\(^5\)The getAssignedIssues function actually returns the results of a query that joins a set of attributes from the Projects, Issues and User tables
Figure 5 Integrating security access features with EasyData in the Ruby implementation of Controller components.
control filter as specified by the filter_access_to option. The output dataset will be 4-anonymous via generalization of the QI formed by project_name, issue_name, organization and start_date.

5 Evaluation

In this section we evaluate the validity of the EasyData PbD reengineering method to test the hypothesis that it can provide an advantage in terms of reliability and maintainability over other LD solutions. Therefore, we compare EasyData with a baseline of five LD frameworks, which were analyzed in Section 3.1. A thorough inspection was carried out on the software libraries implementation, in order to filter out components that do not provide an equivalent function to our solution’s, or have nothing in common between compared frameworks. To ensure a comparable scope and to avoid bias in the filtering criteria, all the library components were carefully analyzed by experts who had previously built IS [25] and SPM applications [43] using these LD frameworks.
In order to understand and analyze the advantages, a benchmark is performed on a number of static analysis metrics of reliability, maintainability and complexity. Measures have been computed with the SonarQube source code static analysis tool. The compared frameworks have been selected as long as they implement LDAA software component modules for either data or API wrapping approaches, they are implemented in a language that can be statically analyzed, and the source code is openly available.

5.1 Measures

The software metrics chosen for static analysis enable to compare software reliability and security, maintainability, and size and complexity, among other features. Except for the size metric, the reliability, maintainability and complexity metrics delivered by SonarQube are language-independent, so the tools can be compared despite their implementation language. The following are the types of metrics provided:

- **Size and complexity**: measurements of size and complexity of the code.
  - \(\text{LOC}\): physical Lines of Code; physical LOCs are a simple, source code-dependent measure of the program size.
  - \(\text{Statements}\): number of statements in the source code; SonarQube unifies this metric and makes it independent of the parsed language.
  - \(\text{Functions}\): number of functions in the source code.
  - \(\text{CC}\): Cyclomatic Complexity (CC), computed based on the number of control flow paths through the code [33]. SonarQube varies slightly the standard calculation, depending on the implementation language.
  - \(\text{CC Density (CCD)}\): density measured as the average CC per statement in the source code; it provides a program size-independent measurement of complexity, which is demonstrated to be a useful predictor of software maintenance productivity [16].

- **Maintainability and code duplication**: amount of code involved in duplications.
  - \(\text{Code smells}\): the number of code smells, as symptoms in the source code that may indicate a deeper problem.
  - \(\text{Technical debt (TD)}\): the effort to fix all maintainability issues, measured as hours of required work to remediate the issues, or

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\(^6\)https://www.sonarqube.org/
the ratio between the cost to develop the software and the cost to fix it. This ratio is computed as the remediation cost divided by the development cost. The development cost is estimated as 0.06 days (i.e., nearly 30 minutes) per line of code [7].

- **Lines**: number of duplicated lines in the target language.
- **Blocks**: number of duplicated blocks of lines in the target language.
- **Density**: a measurement of the density of code duplication (i.e., number of duplicated lines / overall LOC).

- **Reliability and security**: measurements of reliability and security of the source code.
  - **Bugs**: the number of bugs, as a measure of software reliability, and a estimated amount of hours for remediation.
  - **Vulnar**: the number of known vulnerabilities found, as a measure of software security, and a estimated amount of hours for remediation.

These metrics are not completely independent from each other. For example, size and complexity metrics are a clear indicator of software maintainability [16], while code duplication is a kind of code smell known as dispensable code, meaning a portion of unnecessary code that, if properly removed, would make the code cleaner, more efficient or easier to understand. Code dispensability is related with the technical debt. The reason to disclose such metrics separately is to check the reliability and maintainability of the different software solutions due to different causes that might be improved.

The more complex software frameworks are, the more functions they implement. Consequently, the entire source code of software frameworks should not be analyzed. The source code analysis should only cover the software modules of each framework concerned with the wrapping and linked data conversion functions that are common to the LDAA. Some frameworks or software tools are small and only perform such functions. Therefore, the source code of larger frameworks has been inspected in detail to filter out modules that implement non-comparable functions. The excluded modules have been those implementing certain functions of the data access, integration and storage layer (e.g., Sesame SPARQL implementations and Silk interlinking libraries, among others) as well as tool-specific functions that are not related with the rest of tools (e.g., Stanbol’s semantic enrichment of contents). The list of modules that have been included in the analysis of each tool can be examined in the appendix.
5.2 Results

As shown in Tables 2 and 3, the EasyData implementation considerably reduces CC and TD values. Since such measurements are dependent on the program size, it is more accurate to observe the TD ratio and CC density to compare different solutions. In this vein, the TD ratio and CCD are lower for EasyData than for other solutions. The reduced TD has an influence in the maintainability of the solution.

On the other hand, all solutions present a smaller code duplication density than EasyData (see code duplication metrics in Table 3). Some frameworks, such as Hydra and Triplify, also present a better reliability and security remediation cost, measured as remediation hours required to fix bugs and vulnerabilities. That means a need for improvement of the EasyData implementation. Yet the number of vulnerabilities (see Table 4) is fewer for EasyData and HydraBundle, mainly because they make a less intensive use of existing libraries and components that might add security issues.

With respect to the size and complexity (see Table 2), HydraBundle, EasyData and Triplify have lesser complex implementations than other frameworks. Tools like D2Rq and Datalift add an extra complexity, because

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>LOC</th>
<th>#statements</th>
<th>#functions</th>
<th>CC</th>
<th>CCD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D2Rq</td>
<td>14,108</td>
<td>6,473</td>
<td>1,516</td>
<td>3,239</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanbol</td>
<td>4,701</td>
<td>1,887</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HydraBundle</td>
<td>2,354</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triplify</td>
<td>1,352</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Datalift</td>
<td>16,037</td>
<td>7,009</td>
<td>1,349</td>
<td>3,043</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>3,773</td>
<td>2,195</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>#code smells</th>
<th>hours</th>
<th>ratio</th>
<th>#lines</th>
<th>#blocks</th>
<th>density</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D2Rq</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>1.25%</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanbol</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>1.99%</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HydraBundle</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>1.35%</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triplify</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>2.85%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Datalift</td>
<td>1,028</td>
<td>112.3</td>
<td>1.46%</td>
<td>2382</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>14.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>18.21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Table 4  Reliability and security of NAME compared to other LD frameworks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>#bugs</th>
<th>#vulner</th>
<th>#bugs</th>
<th>#vulner</th>
<th>Remediation effort (h)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D2Rq</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanbol</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HydraBundle</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triplify</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Datalift</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1,175</td>
<td>1,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

they make use of a lot of handful libraries that have to be properly integrated and managed in the source code. This criterion is less relevant for EasyData, since the source code of the eventually extended LD application is automatically generated by the framework, so the need to manage code complexity issues, which have to do with the programmers’ difficulty for code maintenance, is less relevant.

5.3 Discussion

The EasyData LDAA extension strategy can be exploited to fulfill non-functional features that might be defined for an existing web application. Its aim is not to define a new technique for linking heterogeneous linked data schemata and LD datasets (i.e. interlinking). One reason is that including an interlinking feature in EasyData might constrain the evolution of generated RDF models, whilst the interlinking function can be carried out through readily available tools, as explained elsewhere [54].

As opposed to the black-box wrapping approaches for adding linked data or converting an application’s output to linked data, the white-box extension approach of EasyData enables to modify the application components that are needed. When doing that, diverse non-functional requirements can be readily implemented. Thus, this white-box strategy is essential to fulfill security and privacy preservation requirements. Data records that may constitute a publicly relevant dataset are never disclosed from the underlying application implementation without being in the first place secured and privacy-preserved, with considerable savings in complexity and reliability.

The EasyData reengineering method combines the LDAA data wrapping and LDAA API extension in an integrated approach, which exposes the application data model and generates a new LD API, providing also a hook
Privacy-Preserving Reengineering of MVC Application Architectures Using LD

to implement diverse non-functional requirements. In its current implementation, EasyData can provide a unified security access control layer, similar to other LD frameworks, additionally to privacy preservation measures, which are not as common. Thus, external agents can be properly authorized to browsing and accessing an application’s resources under a set of privacy restrictions.

Although the privacy preservation rules defined in EasyData are focused on the \( k \)-anonymity model, these can be extended to other privacy models, such as probabilistic \( k \)-anonymity [47] or \( \varepsilon \)-differential privacy [11], without changing the core of the application. It would only be necessary to adjust the current set of sanitization options to a new set of PPDP methods that make it possible to achieve the requirements of a new privacy model. For instance, in an attempt to achieve probabilistic \( k \)-anonymity, the current sanitization options should be extended to generalization, microaggregation and rank swapping [42]. However, to achieve differentially private datasets, the sanitization option should be replaced by noise addition [41]. On the other hand, to provide protection against attribute disclosure (besides identity disclosure), and thus, offer a stronger privacy guarantee, EasyData could be adapted to combine \( k \)-anonymity with other privacy models, such as, \( l \)-diversity [31] or \( t \)-closeness [30].

5.4 Threats to Validity and Limitations

A major concern of the EasyData white-box approach is that the described LDAA extension strategy is deeply integrated with the internal data model and logic of the legacy web application. This tight coupling eliminates the separation of concerns in a separate linked data layer and implies that changes to the inner workings of the web application may affect the EasyData plugin implementation. In practical terms, this can make maintenance more difficult if the original web application source code is not under the control of the LDAA extension developer. For instance, in the Redmine example it is not straightforward to migrate to new Redmine versions without breaking the EasyData plugin. Black-box approaches, on the other hand, would only require the web application to provide a stable API, which is not always easy though. In this vein, the Hydra approach improves the decoupling of linked data consumer and provider by means of a core vocabulary that can be used to describe and document generic web APIs. The EasyData approach should follow a similar approach to be more general.
Compared to other solutions as Datalift, EasyData does not provide a powerful interlinking technique to map heterogeneous metadata from different web sources. The links to external vocabularies and resources must be discovered by means of an external interlinking tool, and then used to modify the RDF model generated by EasyData. This flexible approach enables to evolve the interlinking result without parsing the model again, but we must rely on an interlinking tool to ensure completeness of the RDF model.

6 Conclusion

The EasyData approach presented in this paper makes it flexible to implement security and privacy properties in a legacy web application using linked data technologies. The LDAA extension approach can be practiced at diverse layers of the architectural components of a web application. In this paper, we have described the application to the controller layer of a regular MVC-based architecture. The EasyData privacy by design procedure is constrained to MVC-based web application architectures as well as the availability of source code. The LD model of a legacy web application can be disclosed and published with privacy preservation through any controller operation. The overall process is not based on adding middleware components, wrappers or adaptors, which can reduce the reliability and maintainability while increasing the complexity of the overall software architecture. A number of internal configurations can make it also possible to prepare for interlinking and alignment of the legacy application data model with external RDF sources. Configuring the application with external models and schemata beyond the legacy application data model is highly recommendable to interlink heterogeneous entities in the Web of data. As a future work, the EasyData implementation is planned to be augmented to connect the generated LDAA extensions with existing interlinking tools.

Overall, our results are subject to the scope of MVC-based application architectures, the use of linked data development frameworks and the implementation of non-functional confidentiality and privacy restrictions. Other web architectures, development technologies and intended non-functional properties should be further evaluated, though EasyData is a promising LDAA extension approach for other realms.
Appendix

Public Evaluation Data

The SonarQube analysis on all the tools and frameworks of this paper are publicly available in sonarcloud.io\(^7\). The analysis was executed with SonarQube scanner\(^8\). To extract the relevant metrics for this paper, the sonarcloud.io Web API\(^9\) was used. A JSON output is obtained by means of simple scripts like that of Figure 7. Then the JSON output is converted to CSV\(^10\) to do the analysis on a regular spreadsheet.

All the software modules and packages that are included in the analysis for the more complex linked data frameworks are listed in Figure 8 (Stanbol).

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\(^7\)https://sonarcloud.io/organizations/dodero-github/projects
\(^8\)https://docs.sonarqube.org/display/SCAN/Analyzing+Source+Code
\(^9\)https://sonarcloud.io/web_api/
\(^10\)https://konklone.io/json/
Figure 9  Datalift modules included in the source code analysis

and Figure 9 (Datalift). As for the simpler tools, such as Triplify, HydraBundle and EasyData, all modules were included in the analysis. In the D2Rq case, all modules were included except src/de/fuberlin/wiwiss/d2rq/server.

Acknowledgements

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List of Abbreviations

API Application Programming Interface
CC Cyclomatic Complexity
CCD Cyclomatic Complexity Density
IS Information Science
LD Linked Data
LDAA Linked Data Application Architecture
LOC Lines Of Code
LOD Linked Open Data
MVC Model-View-Controller
ORM Object-Relational Mapping
PII Personally Identifiable Information
PbD Privacy by Design
PPDP Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing
QI Quasi-Identifier
RBAC Role-Based Access Control
SbD Security by Design
SPM Software Process Management
TD Technical Debt

References


Privacy-Preserving Reengineering of MVC Application Architectures Using LD


Biographies

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