

4

An Identity-Based Conceptual Framework for the Assessment of Tolerance in Education Curricula

Karina V. Korostelina

George Mason University

Abstract

Tolerance is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon that could be analyzed on three levels: individual, intergroup relations, and society. A social identity-based approach helps to understand major foundations of tolerance through the analysis of the dynamics of identity-based conflicts. This chapter describes the process of building tolerance in education as a continuum that progresses from *incitement to violence and hatred* (intense dislike and hatred of an outgroup, justified willingness to fight with or harm outgroup members) to *prejudice* (an unjustified or incorrect negative attitude toward members of an outgroup based on the membership of the ingroup) to *tolerance* (an acceptance of the Other — a fair, objective, and permissive attitude toward those whose opinions, beliefs, practices, racial or ethnic origins, etc., differ from one's own) and then to *mutual understanding* (including critical analysis of conflict, empathy, compassion, and willingness to cooperate). The chapter proposes an assessment framework based on 14 indicators, including: salience and forms of identity, metacontrast, prototypes, favorable comparison, projection, social boundary, relative deprivation, collective axiology, etc. This assessment framework can serve as a foundation for the development of textbooks and teaching manuals as well as an overall assessment of curricula and education policies.

4.1 An Identity-Based Conceptual Framework for the Assessment of Tolerance in Education Curricula

The concept of a “culture of peace” was first formulated by the International Congress on Peace in the Minds of Men, held in Cote d’Ivoire in 1989. In 1995, the 28th General Conference of UNESCO introduced the Medium-Term Strategy for 1996–2001 (28 C/4) centered around this concept: “To counter the culture of war, let us build a culture of peace, that is to say a culture of social interaction, based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, tolerance and solidarity, and respect for all human rights; a culture that rejects violence and, instead, seeks a solution to problems through dialogue and negotiation; a culture of prevention that endeavors to detect the sources of conflicts at their very roots, so as to deal with them more effectively and, as far as practicable, to avoid them” (UNESCO, 1995). In 1997, the 52nd session of the United Nations General Assembly discussed the specific topic — “Towards a Culture of Peace” — and proclaimed the year of 2000 as the International Year for the Culture of Peace. The decade of 2001–2010 was defined as the “International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World” by the 53rd session of the United Nations General Assembly that adopted the Resolution A/53/25 based on the proposal of the group of Nobel Peace Prize laureates. Over 75 million people around the globe (more than 1% of the world’s population) signed the common pledge drafted by the Nobel laureates to promote the universal principles of a culture of peace and non-violence in daily life.

Since then, multiple documents and resolutions of UNESCO emphasize the importance of a culture based on peace and tolerance. The UNESCO documents discuss that a culture of peace does not rest on a passive form of tolerance or abstract pacifism; instead, it creates clear paths to combat injustice, inequality, and oppression. The culture of peace functions as a “moral code in action” that requires profound obligation to create a just and peaceful world with values of human dignity and inclusion. The culture of peace is inconsistent with poverty, discrimination, and inequality and requires equal education, just distribution of wealth and knowledge, and development of democracy. Thus, the formation of a culture of peace and tolerance includes both the prevention of direct and structural violence as well as actively working toward creating a more just and equal world, as formulated in Galtung’s (1969) concepts of negative and positive peace. While negative peace requires fighting against the culture of war, positive peace promotes a culture of tolerance, equality, and inclusion (Adams, 2002).

These positive and negative components of a culture of peace are evident in many societies, revealing the complex interplay of tolerance and peace; there is “persistence of social images of life at peace, the ineradicable longing for that peace, and the numbers of social movements working for a more just and peaceful world” (Boulding, 2006b). In their everyday life, people do not only try to avoid conflicts and violence but also negotiate differences and build resilient communities, creating international solidarity and unity in fighting injustices and inequalities (Cromwell and Vogeleson, 2009).

The international community also formulated ways of building this culture of peace. The first International Forum on the Culture of Peace was organized in San Salvador (El Salvador) in 1994. Analyzing the formation of a culture of peace across the globe, the participants formulated three main means that are essential for this development: education, democratization, and participation. The educational component was further advanced at the 44th session of the International Conference on Education in 1994. Education (especially education for the peaceful resolution of conflict) is among UNESCO’s eight areas of building of peace culture. This dimension of nurturance that includes tolerance, education, and equality was stressed as a critical aspect of a culture of peace (De Rivera 2004b).

One of the most important ways of achieving peace culture, according to these documents, is the development of a global identity that involves both local identities and a global solidarity against common threats to the planet. “The culture of peace may thus be defined as all the values, attitudes and forms of behavior, ways of life and of acting that reflect, and are inspired by, respect for life and for human beings and their dignity and rights, the rejection of violence, including terrorism in all its forms, and commitment to the principles of freedom, justice, solidarity, tolerance and understanding among peoples and between groups and individuals” (UNESCO, 1995). Boulding (2000b) also stresses the importance of understanding identity balance — between the need for autonomy and the need for relatedness — for both promoting tolerance and mutual understanding among people. She sees a peace culture as “a mosaic of identities, attitudes, values, beliefs. . . that lead people. . . to deal creatively with their differences and share their resources” (Boulding, 2000a, p. 196).

An identity-based approach to forming a culture of peace and tolerance through education emphasizes the reframing narratives of intergroup relations, the redefinition of conflict-based discourses, and the rehumanization of former enemies. This approach includes both negative and positive aspects of peace, discussed above, as it not only alters the negative

representations of the Other but also challenges patterns of exclusion and inclusion, discrimination, and inequality based on belonging to particular social categories of ethnicity, religion, gender, and nation. “The culture of peace encourages peaceful interaction that refrains from violence and settles conflicts by improving positive relationships between the parties involved in various sectors of human life and activity: education, politics, economics, and daily routines. This culture, while acknowledging the differences that exist amongst humans and human groups, values such diversity as a source of richness and strength to the global community” (Korostelina, 2012, p. 6). An identity-based approach to tolerance encourages the celebration of diversity and mutuality, developing peaceful and just communities around the globe.

This approach explains how tolerance can be developed through education across ethnic, religious, and national lines by promoting the growth of new cultural forms out of old ones (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). First, education is a powerful vehicle for changing norms of exclusion and difference and developing new norms of inclusion and mutuality (Richards & Swanger, 2009). Second, an identity-based approach can help alter the meaning of intergroup relations, challenging the narratives of each side of the conflict and denigration of the Other, as well as in increasing one’s own group’s responsibility for the others’ suffering (Salomon & Clairins, 2009). Third, it also promotes reflection on power, dominance, and categorical inequality in the creation of the culture of peace.

The chapter describes the process of building tolerance in education as a continuum that progresses from *incitement to violence and hatred* (intense dislike and hatred of an outgroup, justified willingness to fight with or harm outgroup members) to *prejudice* (an unjustified or incorrect negative attitude toward members of an outgroup based on the membership of the ingroup) to *tolerance* (an acceptance of the Other — a fair, objective, and permissive attitude toward those whose opinions, beliefs, practices, racial or ethnic origins, etc., differ from one’s own) and then to *mutual understanding* (including critical analysis of conflict, empathy, compassion, and willingness to cooperate). The chapter proposes an assessment framework based on 14 indicators, including salience and forms of identity, metacontrast, prototypes, favorable comparison, projection, social boundary, relative deprivation, collective axiology, etc. This assessment framework can serve as a foundation for the development of textbooks and teaching manuals as well as overall assessment of curricula and education policies.

4.2 Indicators

Social Categorization:

Social categorization — the perception of people through their membership in social groups — defines how a person and others see her or his position in a society, impacts a person's self-image (Abrams & Hogg, 1988), helps a person make sense of the world (Reynolds Turner & Haslam, 2000), reduces ambiguity and uncertainty (Hogg, 2007), and leads a person to behave in ways that are consistent with the group (Hogg & Haines, 1996; Turner, 1975). Salience is the most important characteristic of identity that can vary on a continuum from strong to weak, influencing a person's attachment to the group as well as their loyalty and behavior to the group (Berry et al., 1989; Brewer, 1991; Brewer, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Persons with a high salience of ethnic identity have a strong connection to other members of the group, positive feelings about the group, and a commitment to its values and goals (Phinney, 1991). Identity that remains salient for a long period becomes a central identity affecting a person's behavior.

Salient identity has significant impacts on how a person responds to different situations and is strongly linked to negative attitudes and violent behavior. Most studies on social identity provide evidence of a relationship between the salience of identity and attitudes toward outgroups. Other research results confirm the role of salient identity in shaping political attitudes and behavior (Conover, 1988; Miller, et al., 1981) and reveal strong correlations between salient identity and outgroup hostility (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Grant & Brown, 1995). Any threat to beliefs and positions of the group reinforces the salience of social identity and can lead to collective actions (Brewer, 2007; Ting-Toomey et al., 2000). Salience of identity is constructed in education, mass media, and political discourse in multiple ways, including 1) stress on the importance of a particular (ethnic, national, or religious) identity, 2) multiple mentions of particular identity in comparison to others, and 3) references to the importance of loyalty to particular groups. The salience of identity and acceptance of an ingroup's norms impact intergroup forgiveness and reconciliation (Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi & Lewis, 2008; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). For example, salient national identity has been associated with the support for strong responses to terrorist attacks and less concerns for human rights in the United States (Fischer, Greitemeyer & Kastenmuller, 2007), Europe (Strabac & Listhaug, 2008), the United Kingdom (Brighton, 2007), and Australia (Musgrove & McGarty, 2008; Strelan & Lawani, 2010). Thus, the emphasis on salience of a particular identity reduces the likeliness for

reconciliation while the increased salience of common identity positively contributes to the reconciliation process (Staub, Pearlman & Hagengimana, 2005).

Social categorization theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) stresses the critical role of *group prototypes* in defining the meaning of group membership and understanding the norms, values, and behavior of group members. A prototype is a particular person who represents the most important beliefs and values of a group by serving as an emotional function and increasing cohesiveness within the group. A prototype focuses on the similarities within an ingroup, which strengthens social identity — differences found from those of the prototype are perceived as less attractive and even unfavorable. A leader as a prototype could promote conflict intentions, establish enemy images and threat narratives, and motivate group members to continue the fight. Alternatively, a prototype can promote values and ideas of peace and forgiveness, increasing groups' participation in reconciliation practices. Thus, a promotion of specific ingroup prototypes can impact the reconciliation process. The impediments can come from the employment of main historical figures who are warriors or protectors of faith, people who sacrificed their life, or individuals who led people to fight with the other group as the enemy (Korostelina, 2013). Usually, violent actions of these prototypes (e.g., suicide attacks, fighting, etc.) are positively evaluated. To support reconciliation processes, it is important to endorse prototypes that are peaceful, forgiving people who promote tolerance and coexistence.

Social categorization theory also emphasizes the role of *metacontrast* — the perception that differences within an ingroup are smaller than those between ingroup and outgroup — in intergroup relations. A high level of metacontrast enhances intergroup differences, reduces understanding, empathy, and compassion. For example, some religious doctrines strive to establish intrareligious hegemony by maximizing the contrast with the dominant outgroup; Christianity or Judaism, for example, maximizes intergroup difference to produce extreme, maximally counterintuitive concepts (Nicholson, 2014). The greater the perceived difference in the typical characteristics of the ingroup and the outgroup, the greater the predisposition to hostility (Oakes, 1987; Turner et al., 1994). Metacontrast can be boosted in ingroup narratives through the description of all ingroup members as similar to each other, having the same destiny, goals, and aspirations as well as through the stress on differences with the outgroup and its supporters. Such employment of metacontrast can negatively impact reconciliation processes by stressing differences between groups and fostering ingroup homogeneity.

4.3 Negative Attitudes Toward the Other

The theory of social identity suggests that people have an essential need to acquire high social status and a positive identity through membership in socially prestigious groups. This search for positive self-esteem is the basis for the formation of negative attitudes toward outgroups (Brown, 2000; Huddy & Virtanen 1995; Jackson et al., 1996; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Taylor et al., 1987; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990). This basic need leads to the *favorability comparison* — the tendency to evaluate outgroups negatively in contrast to the ingroup that results in the formation of positive stereotypes related to ingroup members and negative stereotypes related to outgroup members. Thus, a favorable comparison develops perceptions of outgroups as a “second sort” of people, leading to prejudices and blatant discrimination. The need for favorable comparison is even more important if groups have a low economic and social status, have a minority position in society, or lack the opportunity to promote, develop, or revive their culture. Reconciliation processes can be highly impacted by these favorable comparison processes, especially if ingroup narratives represent the ingroup as superior to the outgroup, including its culture, history, religion, values, and traditions. To combat such comparison, ingroup narratives could concentrate on internal locus of self-esteem (Korostelina, 2007) that can be archived through 1) the emphasis on rich cultures, famous artists, writers, scientists, and engineers, 2) previous exceptional positions or roles throughout history, and 3) their uniqueness or exceptionality. If ingroup members are proud of their identity and have a high sense of confidence, they have a lesser tendency to use a favorable comparison between their groups and outgroups.

Global attribution (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1979) is described as a tendency for people to over-emphasize dispositional, or character-based, explanations for behaviors observed in outgroups while over-emphasizing the role and power of situational influences on ingroup behavior. Pettigrew (1979) described a tendency of ingroup members to make internal (dispositional) attributions for successes of the ingroup and external (situational) attributions for the ingroup’s failures while making internal (dispositional) attributions for the outgroup’s failures and external (situational) attributions for the outgroup’s successes, leading to the fundamental attribution error. Hewstone (1989) reviewed many studies documenting the fundamental attribution error and found that this error leads to increased conflict between groups. Global attribution error provides justifications of aggressive ingroup actions as a response to the situation created by the intentions of the outgroup.

In ingroup narratives, actions of an outgroup are interpreted in terms of their harmful and aggressive motivation and goals, while actions of ingroup are interpreted in terms of response to the situation (often created by the outgroup). Such perception reduces success of reconciliation processes by placing the responsibility for aggression and violence on the outgroup and denying accountability of the ingroup.

Psychodynamic theory (Volkan, 1997; Volkan 2004) describes this process of the justification of ingroup actions by putting the blame on the outgroup as *projection*. As a person inclined to deny negative characteristics of herself or himself, groups also tend to project negative images into others (Volkan, 1998). More specifically, people tend to split off and externalize negative aspects of oneself — the characteristics they do not want to acknowledge or take responsibility for. Group identity is perceived as a “large canvas tent” that shields group members from external threat (Volkan, 1998, p. 27). According to the theory, as long as this tent remains robust and steady, the ingroup members are not conscious of its role and do not need to continuously ascertain or define their group identity. But when the tent becomes unstable or disturbed, ingroup members raise their collective concerns and work together “to shore it up” again (Volkan, 1998, p. 27). In these situations, ingroup members project their negative features on outgroup members. Projection externalizes and ascribes to outgroups the negative characteristics of the ingroup or explains ingroup actions by provocation of the outgroup. Thus, the ingroup can justify its aggressiveness by the need for defense provoked by the threatening actions of an outgroup. Or, the ingroup can validate its disloyalty by attributing treasons to the outgroup. The ingroup narratives can emphasize descriptions of ingroup actions as protective in response to outgroup aggression, rejections of peace and coexistence based on the description of the outgroup as liars, deceivers, and not trustworthy, and justifications of ingroup violent actions by describing outgroup as a provocateur. Similar to global attribution error, such narratives can impede reconciliation processes by denying ingroup responsibility and reducing willingness to collaborate with the vicious outgroup.

4.4 Forms of Identity

To understand the impact of social identity on the formation of a culture of tolerance, it is important to concentrate not only on salience but also on the meaning of group identities. One of the ways to explore identity meaning is to look at the specific forms that a particular identity can take,

including: cultural, reflected, and mobilized (Korostelina, 2007). The *cultural form of identity* is rooted in the poetics of everyday life of a group, involving cuisine and diet; attires and costumes; typical daily routines; music, songs, and dance; rituals and habits; and festivals, holidays, and special ceremonies for festivities or grief. While beliefs, positions, and norms are essential for this form of identity, they are considered given and foundational and usually do not become a subject of reflection. Individuals live “within” their cultural identity, abiding by all ingroup norms and prescriptions but never question the values, aims, and intents of their ingroup, and assess relations between ingroup and other groups based on cultural differences and similarities. As cultural forms of social identity do not aid in deepening the understanding of the meaning of ingroup identity and connotation intergroup relations, any violations (even without any intention to infringe) of specific cultural rituals, norms or customs could be perceived as a threat to ingroup identity, inciting conflict intentions, and reducing the culture of tolerance. Such cultural forms can be formed in education curricula through 1) presentations of traditions, customs, and cultural holidays as rightful, 2) avoidance of discussions about the historic development of national identity, roots, and meaning of cultural traditions, and 3) negative representations of other cultures.

The *reflected form of identity* is associated with a deeper comprehension of the history of the ingroup and its relations with outgroups; it refers to the attentiveness of the social status and place of the ingroup in a society in addition to an understanding of its aims and perspectives. This identity form also concentrates on values and beliefs of the group with a deeper knowledge about its historic roots and an acknowledgement of the position of the group among other groups in a society. The reflected form has a strong prospective to become a foundation of the formation of a culture of tolerance, as it is rooted in an advanced comprehension of ingroup values and goals as well as an understanding and appreciation of the differences between groups. The reflected form also supports a deeper consideration for positions and activities of ingroup and outgroup members, analyzing intergroup relations from a more balanced point of view. Such reflected form can be developed in education curricula through 1) increasing awareness of the history, roots, and sources of the ingroup, its relationship to outgroups, and the current status, position, and perspectives of the ingroup; 2) an emphasis on understanding of common history and shared goals with outgroup; and 3) the presentation of the roots and meanings of regional cultural traditions and beliefs that can unify nations.

The *mobilized form of identity* is based on the view of ingroup identity from the standpoint of intergroup relations, concentrating on comparisons between groups' power, status, and problems in intergroup relations. The meaning of the ingroup arrives from the competitive assessment of the positions and goals of outgroups. While a mobilized form of identity also includes customs, values, and cultural characteristics, they are less essential than this intergroup comparison. Such ideologization of mobilized identity leads to the perception of competition, contradictions, and incompatibility of goals between the two groups (Korostelina, 2007). The meaning of mobilized identity centers around the need to increase the status or power of the ingroup, readiness to compete or fight against the outgroup that results in negative intergroup relations. Such mobilized forms can be formed in education curricula through 1) depicting of the aims, values, and ideas of a particular nation as the only possible or rightful way of thinking, 2) praising national leadership as the only ones capable to lead a nation, demanding faithfulness and submission to this leadership, 3) presenting of members of outgroups as adversaries, and urging students to unite against their continuous demands, and 4) stressing the intergroup interaction of a "we–they" opposition perspective.

4.5 Interrelations Between Groups

A *social boundary* is a crucial mechanism of the formation of social identities which defines not only the relationship between groups but also the meaning of the ingroup identity (Barth, 1981). The social boundary is a distinctive narrative about relations on both sides of the boundary and across the boundary that is formed as people cultivate and sustain relations within their groups as well as develop interrelations between the groups across this social boundary (Tilly, 2005). These narratives form the foundations for collective identities and define meaning of boundaries as sites common to two groups (Eyal, 2006; Thelen, 2002).

Social boundaries are contingent on a variety of contextual factors, including the cultural repertoires, customs, and dominant narratives in a particular group as well as on political movements or collective actions (Doevenspeck, 2011; Lamont, 2000; Somers, 1994; Swidler, 2001). The cultural and political elites also delineate social boundaries, outlining how encompassing, restricting, and accessible a particular social boundary should be (Horowitz, 1975), creating social order, defining and classifying relations between social groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Social boundaries are

formed through the creation of new narratives of difference or borrowing of different boundaries, encounters between previously distinct or competing groups, and shifting meanings of ingroup identities (McAdam et al., 2001). A metacontrast — a tendency to minimize the intragroup differences and maximize the intergroups dissimilarities, as discussed above — make social boundaries more impermeable (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Together with established and institutionalized categories as foundations for social boundaries (ethnic, national, religious, etc.), various conceptions, interpretative schemata, and cultural dimensions also can contribute to the development, maintenance, and contestation of differences between social groups (Lamont et al., 2015). Such *symbolic boundaries* establish essential distinctions, contesting and redefining the meaning of established social boundaries. In some cases, symbolic boundaries become so salient that they replace social boundaries (Lamont & Molnar, 2002). In these cases, symbolic boundaries become mechanisms for contentious politics, challenging or preserving existing power relations and patterns of exclusion and inclusion, and opportunity hoarding (Bourdieu, 1977; Gramsci & Lipset, 1959; Tilly, 2003; Tilly, 2006).

The education curricula can make a social boundary more impermeable, supporting social hierarchies, discrimination, and exploitation by 1) the removal of any history of positive relations, traces of interaction, and descriptions of shared living spaces from textbooks; 2) the denial or downplaying of similarities between groups and emphasis on differences as unsolvable and permanent; 3) the defining of the ingroup and outgroup as distinct groups with different histories, divergent core values, and paths of development; 4) the promotion of the dominance of the ingroup over the outgroup and denial of the cultural rights of the outgroup; and 5) the stress on the controversial and disputed aspects of history and the roots of conflicts, misunderstandings, and historical divides.

It can also challenge existing social and symbolic boundaries, making them more open or creating new social and symbolic boundaries that reduce inequality and exclusion and promote tolerance. It can be done through 1) a shift of perspective from ingroup histories to a common approach to history and emphasis on common tendencies and transnational processes; 2) the creation of an opportunity for ingroup members to understand the views of outgroups; 3) depiction of major concepts around society, politics, and international relations from both ingroup and outgroup perspectives; 4) promotion of a history of positive interrelations, common experiences, and

collaborations; and 5) providing a balanced assessment of historical events based on a multiplicity of perspectives, comparison, and critical thinking.

4.6 Intergroup Competition

Intergroup competition is rooted in *relative deprivation* and horizontal inequalities when members of disadvantaged group perceive more discrimination and have more desire for social change (Gurr, 1970). Feelings of relative deprivation can arrive from the belief that the actual social or economic status of the ingroup is lower than the one expected by the group members (Davis, 1959; Runciman, 1966). It relates to the “perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities” (Gurr, 1970, p. 24). Temporal relative deprivation rests on the comparison between the past position of the group and its current situation, leading to longing for the “good old times” and myths of a Golden Age (Smith, 2011). To explain this relative loss, the ingroup usually blames outgroups and attributes them negative intentions.

Relative deprivation can also result from the comparison of the positions, resources, and power of ingroups and outgroups when members of the ingroup believe that they have less than they deserve in comparison to others (Runciman, 1966; Walker & Smith, 2001). This intergroup comparison leads to a strong belief that an ingroup is disadvantaged and unfairly treated, which invokes feelings of anger, bitterness, and entitlement (Pettigrew, 2015) with an increase in support for redistribution (Shin, 2018). Moreover, relative deprivation has a stronger effect on people’s motivation than absolute deprivation (Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin & Bialosiewicz, 2012.)

Relative deprivation can reflect persistent inequalities, structural violence, and discrimination, thus promoting a change within existing economic and social policies. However, to influence the behavior of ingroup members, relative deprivation does not have to be real: just a perception of difference and disadvantage can provoke conflict intentions (Pettigrew & Tropp 2011). This tendency is often utilized by group leaders and political entrepreneurs to mobilize groups in fighting with outgroups or in supporting discriminatory policies toward them. History curricula can be used to emphasize relative deprivation and reduce tolerance. It can be done through 1) the portrayal of outgroups as having more rights and resources in comparison with the ingroup (fraternal deprivation); 2) stress on limitations of the socio-economic opportunities of the ingroup by outgroups (fraternal deprivation); 3) emphasis of unequal economic, cultural, or political positions of ingroups

and outgroups (fraternal deprivation); 4) descriptions of the ingroup position as worsening over time (temporal deprivation); and 5) descriptions of the ingroup position as worse than it should be (deprivation as expectation).

4.7 Ingroup Victimization

Collective victories and defeats can be emphasized by ingroup leadership and influence a person's perceptions of intergroup relations. Volkan describes these perceptions as *chosen glories* (important, usually mythologized and idealized achievements that took place in the past) and *chosen traumas* (losses, defeats, humiliations—also mythologized—that are usually difficult to mourn). These chosen glories and traumas are usually rooted in actual events from the history of the group, functioning as “a shared mental representation of the event, which include realistic information, fantasized expectations, intense feelings, and defense against unacceptable thoughts” (Volkan, 1997). They can be passed from generation to generation as memories of un-mourned ancestors' trauma through the process of *transgenerational transmission*. The memories of ingroup tragedy are transmitted from one generation to the next: collective traumas that remain an unhealed wound emphasize that the ingroup had never achieved justice or retribution from the wrongs that befell their ancestors. Transgenerational transmission of trauma happens “when the mental representation becomes so burdensome that members of the group are unable to initiate or resolve the mourning of their losses or reverse their feelings of humiliation” (Volkan, 1997, p. 45). Chosen traumas are passed down to children and grandchildren in the hope that they may find a way to mourn and resolve persistent problems. New generations accept these memories and emotions as “psychological DNA” planted in their social identity. Thus, transgenerational trauma is trauma that is transferred from the first generation of trauma survivors to the second and further generations of offspring of the survivors via complex post-traumatic stress disorder mechanisms.

However, some of these events could have a small historical significance. They are chosen not because they were essential to the tradition or identity of the group or are passed through generations but because of the current conflicts and contradictions with outgroups. They provide “explanations” for poor economic conditions or minority status. Neisser (1967) describes mnemonic processes as an active construction that involves previous experiences, selection, distortion, and omission of information based on its importance for the reconstructed picture of the past. Collective remembering

is a constant negotiation between past and present, “an active process of sensemaking through the time,” (Warburg, 2010, p. 53), a mnemonic journey that encompasses never-ending reconstruction of the past and its meaning for present and future. Presentations of ingroup victories and defeats in history textbooks help students to unite around powerful ideas of group gains and losses and thus accept ingroup perceptions of intergroup relations.

The chosen traumas of the group can be promoted in educational curricula through an emphasis on the outgroup as extremely aggressive, vicious, and willing to destroy the ingroup through history; vivid descriptions of the aggressive acts of the outgroup in the past; presentation of the ingroup as an innocent victim of the aggressive, dominant outgroup; and a stress on the responsibility of new generations to remember traumas of their parents and to revenge them. Chosen glories are promoted through presentations of the ingroup as successful, with great achievements and glories, and praising the group for achievements. While it is important to provide an educational space to heal collective traumas, a strong emphasis on traumas reduces tolerance and acceptance of the Other. Highlighting ingroup glories can empower ingroup members and reduce the need for favorable comparison and negative perceptions of the Other.

4.8 Outgroup Threat

Realistic threats are threats to existence, (economic and political) power, and the (physical or material) well-being of the ingroup. Symbolic threats are connected to differences in values, morals, and standards between groups and depend on the perceived risks and challenges to the ingroup’s worldview (Stephan et al., 2002). Studies show that both realistic (Bobo, 1999; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson & Armstrong, 2001; Ouillian, 1995) and symbolic (Esses, Haddock & Zanna, 1993; Sears & Henry, 2003; Stephan et al., 2002) threats increase the possibility that biases and prejudice will result in intolerance and discrimination. Other studies show that perceived threats to the ingroup link salient identity with negative attitudes toward the outgroup, ultimately leading to increased intergroup hostility (Johnson, Terry & Louis, 2005; Louis, Duck, Terry, Schuller & Lalonde, 2007).

If groups are in competition for meaningful resources, they will have a stronger feeling of outgroup threat, especially in situations when the conflicting groups have more to gain from succeeding. Numerous studies also show that outgroup threats create more intolerance among ingroup members toward the outgroup, justifying the conflict and the discriminative treatment

of outgroup members. In situations of competition, proximity and contact increase feelings of threat and, thus, intolerance, rather than decreasing it (Brewer, 1972; Levine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966; Sherif & Sherif, 1953; Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). Usually, the ingroup tends to perceive the outgroup as a threat in several contexts of intergroup relations such as the following: 1) unequal economic, cultural, or political positions of ethnic groups (Gellner, 1994); 2) minority status of ethnic groups (Brubaker, 1996); 3) memories of the former domination of the outgroup and attribution of the desire for revival (Gurr & Harff, 1994); 4) perceptions that groups have weaker or worse positions in comparison with the outgroup (Gurr, 1970); 5) limitations of the socio-economic opportunities of the ingroup by outgroups (Gellner, 1994); and 6) political extremism, violence, and nationalism of outgroups (Hagendorn, Linssen, Rotman & Tumanov, 1996).

Social groups are perceived not only as social units but also as organized entities with shared goals, intentions, and inspirations for the future. Thus, members of an ingroup usually see the outgroup not only through their culture, history, or behavioral features (stereotypes), but they also attribute goals to the outgroup (Blumer, 1958; Horowitz, 1985). These ascriptions of hostile and destructive goals lead the views on the outgroup as a threat to the well-being, status, and a very existence of the ingroup. As was discussed above, fundamental attribution error results in attribution of negative, rather than positive, attitudes and goals based on the tendency for people to over-emphasize dispositional, or personality-based, explanations for behaviors observed in others while under-emphasizing the role and power of situational influences on the same behavior (Heider, 1958; Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross, 1977). In the situation of perceived competition between groups, all actions of an outgroup are interpreted in terms of their harmful and aggressive motivation and goals, seen as a possible threat to an ingroup.

One form of the functioning of the outgroup threat is the security dilemma that can reshape social identities and provoke an identity conflict (Lake & Rothchild, 1998). The role of the security dilemma was analyzed on the level of international relations, including the Cold War (Jervis, 1978; Wheeler & Booth, 1992; Spear, 1996), as a source for ethnic conflicts (Posen, 1993; Snyder & Jervis, 1999), and the rise of nationalism (Ven Evra, 1999). Resulting from a zero-sum game perception, the understanding of any advance by an outgroup is seen as a loss for the ingroup. This interpretation rests on perceptions of uncertainty, mutual suspicion, and anxiety among ingroup members regarding the intentions of the outgroup toward them. While the intention to harm others may not be real, these fears increase suspicions and

doubts, leading to violent actions: “It is one of the tragic implications of the security dilemma that mutual fear of what initially may never have existed may subsequently bring about exactly that which is feared most” (Herz, 1950, p.160). Competition between groups is deemed as a struggle for status, with the outgroup gain considered automatically as an ingroup defeat — leading to an increased perception of threat.

Another source of intolerance toward outgroups is a threat to intergroup boundaries: if social borders between the ingroup and outgroup are distorted and weakened, people have increased intentions to protect the distinctiveness of their group (Branscombe, 1999; Michael, Wohl, Nyla, Branscombe & McVicar, 2001). Concerns about the current position and future of the ingroup give rise to strong emotional responses in the form of collective angst (Wohl & Branscombe, 2009; Wohl, Branscombe & Klar, 2006). The more salient an ingroup identity of ingroup members is, the more important it is for them to ascertain and preserve a distinctive group identity and the stronger are the emotional effects of potential distinctiveness loss (Jetten, Spears & Postmaes, 2004). Similarity with outgroup members is perceived as a loss for the ingroup’s essence. To differentiate the ingroup and the outgroup, people often react by emphasizing available dimensions of comparison (Brewer, 2001; Jetten & Spears, 2004). For example, to stress the distinction with an ethnic group, speaking a very similar language and preserving the uniqueness of one’s own ethnic group and its political rights, people can over-emphasize some negative features of outgroup members and develop strong negative stereotypes.

Many studies show that a threat to positive group identity results in intolerance and discrimination against outgroups (Branscombe & Wann, 1994). A social identity threat arrives from the perceived decreased value of ingroup identity resulting from the recognition that the ingroup is discriminated against and is devalued by the outgroup. When group members, and especially those with salient ingroup identity, perceive threats to the ingroup, they tend to increase the relative positivity of their own group by derogating outgroups (Hornsey, 2008). This negative perception and evaluation of the outgroup can result from a perceived social identity threat, even if the outgroup is non-threatening and has low status (Cardinu & Reggiori, 2002).

In education curricula, outgroup threats can be presented through a variety of ways, including description of the ingroup as strongly threatened (physically and culturally) by an outgroup; presentation of the outgroup as having intentions to destroy the ingroup (kill all members and kill leadership), positioning the outgroup as denying identity and culture of the ingroup;

presentation of the outgroup as intending to dissolve identity and culture of the ingroup; description of the outgroup as willing to use all measures against the ingroup; and the emphasis on value differences with the outgroup seen as challenging the ingroup's worldview.

4.9 Collective Axiology

A collective axiology is a common moral and value system that offers moral guidance to ingroup members on how to perceive and treat members of ingroup and outgroups and how to maintain or change relations with them (Rothbart & Korostelina, 2006). It provides a sense of life and world, serves as a criterion for understanding actions and events, and regulates ingroup behaviors. With these criteria, individuals clarify group membership and relations with outgroups. "A collective axiology defines boundaries and relations among groups and establishes criteria for ingroup/outgroup membership. Through its collective axiology, a group traces its development from a sacred past, extracted from mythic episodes beyond the life of mortals, and seeks permanence" (Rothbart & Korostelina, 2006, p. 4). It is a set of constructions that are used to validate, vindicate, rationalize, or legitimize actions, decisions, and policies. Such constructions function as instruments for making sense of episodes of conflict and serve to solidify groups.

Two variables characterize the dynamics of collective axiology: the degree of collective generality and the degree of axiological balance.

- 1) *Collective generality*. The degree of collective generality "refers to the ways in which ingroup members categorize the Other, how they simplify, or not, their defining (essential) character" (Rothbart & Korostelina, 2006, p. 45). Collective generality includes four main characteristics:
 - (i) homogeneity of perceptions and behaviors of outgroup members;
 - (ii) long-term stability of their beliefs, attitudes, and actions;
 - (iii) resistance to change;
 - (iv) the scope or range of the outgroup category.

A high level of collective generality is connected with viewing an outgroup as consistent and homogeneous, demonstrating fixed patterns of behaviors, committed to durable rigid beliefs and values, and widespread in the region or the whole world. A low degree of collective generality reflects the perception of the outgroup as differentiated, exhibiting a variety of behaviors, ready for transformation, and relatively limited in scope. An example of the high level of generality can be found in Greek

history textbooks (see discussion below), which presents all Turks as homogeneous in their aggressive intentions, with a barbarian culture that dominates in society over centuries. An example of low-level generality is the transformation of history education in Germany that increases complexity in descriptions of the actions and motivations of ingroup and outgroups.

The degree of collective generality can change over time, especially in situations of growing intergroup tensions or violence. For example, the escalation of conflict can lead to the perception of an enemy not as a small local group but as an entire race, ethnic group, nationality, or culture. The image of an outgroup can become more rigid, firm, and homogeneous. During violent conflicts, people tend to deny the diversity and competing priorities within an outgroup and its multicultural and political structure, instead, perceiving it as a single “entity” with uniform beliefs and attitudes that support common policies toward other groups.

- 2) *Axiological balance*. “Axiological balance refers to a kind of parallelism of virtues and vices attributed to groups. When applied to stories about the Other, a balanced axiology embeds positive and negative characteristics in group identities” (Rothbart & Korostelina, 2006, p. 46). A balanced axiology leads to the recognition of decency and morality as well as immorality and cruelty among both the Other and the ingroup. A high degree of axiological balance reflects recognition of one’s own moral faults and failings, while a low degree of axiological balance is connected with the perception of one’s ingroup as morally pure and superior and of the outgroup as evil and vicious. This imbalance tends to promote a “tunnel consciousness” and a diminished capacity for independent thought.

“In its extreme form, a low axiological balance is correlated to exaggeration, inflation, and fabrication of outgroup vices and ingroup glories. The ‘Them/Us’ duality seems fixed in the timeless social order. With a fabricated sense of its collective virtues, the ingroup promotes a sense of moral supremacy over the outgroup. Such an unbalanced depiction of group differences provides a ground for a struggle against criminal elements of the world” (Rothbart & Korostelina, 2006, p. 47).

In education curricula, an unbalanced collective axiology and intolerance are developed through the presentation of the ingroup as peace-loving, moral, and victimized and the depiction of the outgroup as aggressive, vicious, and treacherous; the presentation of intergroup relations in terms of “ingroup victimization” – outgroup aggression.

Tolerance can be increased through an emphasis on a balanced collective axiology. In education curricula, a balanced collective axiology can be formed through the presentation of both positive and negative actions of the ingroup; critical analysis of political and social foundations and consequences of negative events; discussion of how aggressive actions of each side arrived from histories of intergroup relations; and reduction of negative and biased representation of outgroups.

Similarly, intolerance is connected with a high generality of collective axiology. In education curricula, high generality arrives from the absence of descriptions of differences in views and actions within both groups; emphasis on similarity of all members within the ingroup as well as within the outgroup; emphasis on permanence of the conflict between groups; and descriptions of the outgroup as always having aggressive intention and unable to change. Tolerance can be promoted through the formation of low generality of collective axiology that relies on the emphasis on differences within the ingroup and outgroup, diversity of opinions and view on conflict and intergroup relations, variety of extreme positions, and voices for tolerance; avoidance of presentation regarding the permanence of an outgroup's aggression through history; descriptions of positive change in relations; and descriptions of the outgroup as willing to reduce conflict.

4.10 Dehumanization

Dehumanization of outgroup members has two types: mechanistic and animalistic (Haslam, 2006). Mechanistic dehumanization rests on the denial of human attributes such as emotional responsiveness, interpersonal warmth, cognitive openness, and agency, which results in the perception of outgroups as cold, rigid, and machine-like. Animalistic dehumanization involves the denial of uniquely human attributes such as civility, refinement, and moral sensibility, leading to the perception of outgroup members as less human and more animal like. Animalistic dehumanization is also described as a process of “infrahumanization” that creates an underestimation of human emotions among outgroup members (Gaunt, Leyens & Demoulin, 2002; Gaunt, Leyens & Sindic, 2004; Leyens et al., 2000).

Both mechanistic and animalistic dehumanization are strongly connected with decreased tolerance toward the Other. In education curricula, mechanistic dehumanization is formed by descriptions of outgroups as cold-minded

killers; depictions of outgroups as rigid and stubborn; and descriptions of outgroups as blind followers of leadership. Animalistic dehumanization can be promoted in education curricula through descriptions of outgroup members in animalistic terms; denial of morality in outgroup; and underestimation of human emotions among outgroup members.

4.11 Ideologization/Manipulation of Identity

Myths, as stories of origination, create the vision of the continuity of social community through a recounting of its past. They contribute to the salience of ingroup identity, delineate the meaning of ingroup membership, and establish the criteria for exclusion rooted in ingroup history and current position of groups within the society. Myths are contextualized within the political life of the community, providing a symbolic basis for social order, underpinning social interconnections, and legitimizing the existing social structure. It highlights and justifies the foundational norms and beliefs of a community, outlining and reshaping the connotations of social identity. Myths express the people's "reality postulates" about the world and concerns as "a moral universe of meaning" (Overing, 1997). Myths do not provide commemoration of mythical events — they reiterate them, making the protagonists of the myth present in contemporary life (Eliade, 1998).

Myths present significant features, norms, and beliefs of ingroups and outgroups, defining the boundaries between them and outlining rules of interaction. Myths contribute to the establishment of nations by determining their foundations, morality, and values. The historical validation of myth is not central to its meaning, rather, the core of myths is constituted by beliefs about criteria for goodness, legitimate participation, and exclusion/inclusion. Thus, myths are one of the crucial mechanisms of cultural reproduction and the "management of meaning" through the production and reproduction of significance in a particular context (Blumenberg, 1988; Bordieu, 1994; Horowitz, 1985; Smith, 2009, 2011). "A myth creates an intellectual and cognitive monopoly in that it seeks to establish the sole way of ordering the world and defining world-views. For the community to exist as a community, this monopoly is vital, and the individual members of that community must broadly accept the myth" (Schopflin, 1997; p.19). People sharing myths constitute a specific social community with a defined identity and social boundary, whereby all others are excluded.

There are three types of myths: foundational myths, legitimizing myths, and ideological myths. Foundational myths provide information about origins

and the mission of a nation — they also define rights and obligations of different groups within a nation. Legitimizing myths are ideologies used by people to legitimate social hierarchies; ideological myths provide security, certainty, and moral authority. Among the 13 functions of the myth defined by Schopflin (1997), eight contribute to the development of social identity and five to the support of regime and legitimization of power. Thus, the first group of functions includes those of identity management that help to define and preserve common identity: 1) self-definition and self-attribution of the ingroup through the set of roles, functions, and purposes; 2) transference of identity and assimilation; 3) establishment of solidarity and illusion of the community through symbolic forms; 4) maintenance of collective memory; and 5) connection to culture. The second group includes functions related to intergroup relations and boundaries: 1) offering explanation for the fate of the community; 2) scapegoating; and 3) construction of the enemy. The third group includes functions of legitimization and support of power: 1) organizing and mobilizing public opinion; 2) simplification of complexity and standardization of knowledge; 3) transfer of political messages; 4) preservation of elites' power; and 5) assertion of legitimacy and strengthening of authority. The legitimizing function of myths is also analyzed through the approximation–creation of distant events closer to the group (Cap, 2007; Esch, 2010; Mazlish, 1981) or as a form of ideological control that maintains social systems and legitimizes power relations (Jost & Banaji, 1994; McFarland, 2005; Sibley & Duckitt, 2010; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). The normative function of myths prescribes specific actions toward other nations (Korostelina, 2019).

Myths employ five mechanisms of justification: 1) impediment by the outgroup; 2) condemning imposition; 3) positive ingroup predispositions; 4) validation of rights; and 5) enlightening (Korostelina, 2013). They can be used in several types of myths or in a specific myth. The first justification mechanism, impediment by the outgroup, is the depiction of a fight between two groups in which the ingroup represents and supports positive values held by the nation. The desired values of the nation promoted by the ingroup vary from a mono-ethnic state based on nationalism to civic society and multiculturalism. The outgroup impedes ingroup activity through the development of conflict by establishing policies and promoting an ideology that is perceived to be wrong, and treating members of the ingroup unfairly through the use of oppression, and violence. Thus, the binary opposition between the “good” and “bad” groups is justified through the depiction of the right actions of the ingroup and the wrong actions of the outgroup. This mechanism

posits ingroup exclusiveness in defining national identity and excludes the outgroup as an illegitimate agent of nation building and justifies the actions and dominance of the ingroup as representing the rightness in a nation. The impediment by outgroup mechanism can be more prominent in myths of foundation, suffering, and unjust treatment, and rebirth and renewal.

The second justification mechanism — condemning imposition — rationalizes the claim that the ingroup represents the interests of every group in the nation while the outgroup is imposing its own narrow ideology, ideas, policies, traditions, ethnic or regional culture, and language on everyone in the nation and wrongly claims to symbolize the nation. The myth explains why the culture or ideology of the outgroup is alien to the people and cannot be accepted by the nation. Thus, the binary opposition between “good” and “bad” groups is justified by the claim that the ingroup represents the whole nation, while the outgroup represents particular morally corrupt interests. This mechanism posits the ingroup as an essential core of the nation, while the outgroup is assigned to a narrow, corrupt subculture. It also justifies the power position of the ingroup in relation to all other groups. The condemning imposition mechanism can be more prominent in myths of ethnogenesis, territory, and Golden Age.

The third justification mechanism, positive ingroup predispositions, describes the ingroup as more able, capable, and competent than the outgroup. These abilities can include entrepreneurial ability and innovation, democratic values and cultures, tolerance, and the support of human rights. The myth describes them as stemming from a long history with greater development, which in turn becomes an essential core of the ingroup mentality. In comparison to the ingroup, the outgroup lacks these abilities because of its simplistic culture, regressive mentality, history, and geography of development. As a result, the outgroup is underdeveloped, conservative, and paternalistic but is trying to promote its ideas as those most suited for the nation. Thus, the ingroup is required to fight with a backward outgroup to prevent it from influencing national development. The opposition between “good” and “bad” groups is justified by the better abilities of one group to lead the nation. This mechanism posits the ingroup as progressive and virtuous, and, therefore, defending the nation from a backward outgroup and justifies the power of the ingroup as better able and suited to rule. The positive ingroup predispositions mechanism can be more prominent in myths of foundation and election.

The fourth justification mechanism, the validation of rights, describes the ingroup as having more rights to develop the nation according to their vision. These rights are based on a more advanced authentic culture, historic

development on native land, birthright, and international acknowledgement. The outgroup has fewer entitlements because it is not native to the land due to its later arrival. The outgroup does not share ethnic roots with the ingroup and, as a result, is deemed to have a simplistic culture and cannot therefore be treated as an equal in the nation building process. In the extreme case — exclusion — the rights of the outgroup are completely denied and members are treated as alien and hostile and are excluded from the nation. The binary opposition between “good” and “bad” groups is justified by validating the exclusive rights of the ingroup and denouncing the rights of the outgroup. This mechanism posits the ingroup as legitimately deserving the power and the outgroup as alien to the nation. It justifies the power of the ingroup as coming from its history and rights to land. The validation of rights mechanism can be more prominent in myths of ethnogenesis and territory.

The fifth justification mechanism, enlightening, emphasizes the willingness of all people in a nation to pursue a particular goal, including civic society, liberalism, ethnic state, and multiculturalism but states that their limited abilities reduce their prospects to achieve their desired outcomes. Limitations stem from a persistent outdated mentality, absence of agency, and a dependency on populist leaders and government. The myth supports the claim of the ingroup as having a greater ability to identify the visions and aims shared by all and to enlighten them in their movement toward these goals. The binary opposition between “good” and “bad” groups is justified by positing the ingroup as the legitimate representatives of the nation, while people who do not share these visions are perceived as outsiders. This mechanism posits the ingroup as representing the shared vision of a positive future and the outgroup as not open-minded enough; it justifies the power of the ingroup as enlightened and progressive. The enlightening mechanism can be more prominent in myths of foundation.

Therefore, through the mechanisms of justification, mythic narratives serve to form and reestablish the specific meaning of national identity and legitimize the power of the ingroup, thus impacting the level of tolerance toward outgroups. In education curricula, impediments by an outgroup can be formed through descriptions of ingroups as having values of justice, equality, and liberty while the outgroup intends to destroy these values and descriptions of the outgroup as promoting destruction, injustice, inequality, and dictatorship. Condemning imposition can be promoted through the emphasis on the intention of the outgroup to totally destroy ingroup culture and values and the emphasis on assimilation policies of outgroups. Positive ingroup predispositions can be formed through descriptions of the ingroup as

having more abilities and more competences than outgroups. The validation of rights and exclusion of an outgroup can be promoted through descriptions of ingroup as superior to outgroups or as one that should receive priority over others (coexistence is not mentioned/not considered as a viable option); depiction of ingroup culture (including religion) is superior to others or as one that should receive a priority. Finally, enlightenment can be formed in education curricula through descriptions of outgroups as wrong oriented; stress on the need to change the outgroup's view; and positioning that the ingroup has to teach/educate the outgroup.

4.12 The Conceptual Framework

Based on the previous discussion describing how the above concepts and theories can contribute to the formation of tolerance in education curricula, I propose the following framework for the assessment of tolerance development. Many existing research projects assess history education curricula through the binary concept of promoting peace/promoting violence. However, in conflicted and divided societies, history education faces the enormous task of addressing injustices, unbalanced power relations without provoking future violence. I propose a framework that progresses from 1) *incitement to violence and hatred* (intense dislike and hate of outgroup, justified willingness to fight with or harm outgroup members) to 2) *prejudice* (an unjustified or incorrect negative attitude toward members of outgroup based on the membership in ingroup), to 3) *tolerance* (as acceptance of the Other — fair, objective, and permissive attitude toward those whose opinions, beliefs, practices, racial or ethnic origins, etc., differ from one's own), and finally to 4) *mutual understanding* (including critical analysis of conflict, empathy, compassion, and willingness to cooperate), based on 14 indicators, including salience and forms of identity, metacontrast, prototypes, favorable comparison, projection, social boundary, relative deprivation, collective axiology etc. (see Table 4.1).

This framework provides a more nuanced approach to forming tolerance through education as it takes into account gradual changes in curricula as well as the complexities of representations of traumas, power imbalances, and injustices of the past and current conflicts. It also provides an opportunity to have a multifaceted assessment of tolerance and reconciliation based on the 14 criteria. Some of them can be more developed toward mutual understanding, while others can be employed to promote hatred and intolerance. The framework can be used to map education curricula

Table 4.1 Identity-based conceptual framework for the assessment of tolerance in education curricula.

Concept	Mutual understanding (including critical analysis of conflict, empathy, compassion, and willingness to cooperate)	Tolerance (as acceptance of the Other — fair, objective, and permissive attitude toward those whose opinions, beliefs, practices, racial or ethnic origins, etc., differ from one's own)	Prejudice (an unjustified or incorrect negative attitude toward members of an outgroup based on the membership in an ingroup)	Incitement to violence and hatred (intense dislike and hate of outgroup, justified willingness to fight with or harm outgroup members)
Salience of identity	Promote multiple and cross-cutting identities Very low level	Promote multiple identities Low level	Promote identities involved in conflict High level	Emphasize only conflict-related identity Very high level
Metacontrast	Prevalence of peaceful prototypes Absent	Both peaceful and aggressive Low level	Prevalence of aggressive prototypes High level	Only aggressive prototypes Prevalent
Prototypes	Absent	Some actions are justified through projection	Majority of actions are justified through projection	All actions are justified through projection
Favorable Comparison Projection	Situational and dispositional attribution applies to both groups	Some prevalence of situational attribution to ingroup and dispositional attribution — to outgroup	Significant prevalence of situational attribution to ingroup and dispositional attribution — to outgroup	Situational attribution applies to only ingroup and dispositional attribution — only to outgroup
Global Attribution Error				

continued

Table 4.1 Continued

Forms of identity	Reflected	Cultural	Mix of cultural and mobilized	Mobilized
Social boundary	Positive narratives of boundary	Mostly positive narratives of boundary	Mostly negative narratives of boundary	Negative narratives of boundary
Relative deprivation	Analysis and critical assessment of inequalities	Emphasis on restoration of equality	Emphasis on relative deprivation	Emphasis on zero-sum competition
Chosen traumas and glories	Prevalence of glories, critical analysis of traumas	Equal presentation of traumas and glories	Emphasis on traumas, some glories support the idea of fighting	Presentation of only traumas, call for fighting
Threat	Critical analysis of threats	Some threats are emphasized with predominantly critical analysis	Emphasis on multiple threats	Significant emphasis on multiple threats
Collective axiology	Balanced with low level of generality	Mostly balanced with low level of generality	Mostly unbalanced with high level of generality	Unbalanced with high level of generality
Dehumanization	Absent	Low level of mechanistic dehumanization	High level of mechanistic dehumanization and low level of animalistic dehumanization	High level of mechanistic and animalistic dehumanization
Myths	Myths support foundations of coexistence, critical analysis of history	Some myths of enlightening and positive ingroup predispositions	Significant myths of enlightening, positive ingroup predispositions, and validation of rights	Prevalence of myths of impediment by outgroup, condemning imposition, and validation of rights

based on these 14 criteria and define concrete areas of improvement. It also can be used as a multidimensional tool for curricula revisions and the education of teachers to promote tolerance and mutual understanding among students.

References

- Abrams, D. & Hogg, M. A. (1988). Comments on the motivational status of self-esteem in social identity and intergroup discrimination. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 18, 317–334.
- Adams, D. (2002). *The American peace movements*. Retrieved: <http://www.culture-of-peace.info/apm/title-page.html>
- Bobo, L. D. (1999). Prejudice as group position: Microfoundations of a sociological approach to racism and race relations. *Journal of Social Issues*, 55, 445–472.
- Bourdieu, P. (1993). *The field of cultural production*. New York, NY: Columbia Press.
- Boulding, E. (2000a). A New Chance for Human Peaceableness? *Peace and Conflict*, 6(3), 193–215.
- Boulding, E. (2000b). *Cultures of Peace: The Hidden Side of Human History*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Blumenberg, H. (1998). *Work on myth*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Blumer, H. (1958). Race prejudice as a sense of group position. *Pacific Sociological Review*, 1, 3–7.
- Branscombe, N. R., Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (1999). The context and content of social identity threats” in N. Ellemers, R. Spears and B. Doosje (Eds.) *Social identity: Context, commitment, content*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Branscombe, N. R., & Wann, D. L (1994). Collective self-esteem consequences of out-group derogation when a valued social identity is on trial. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 24, 641–657.
- Brewer, M. B. (2000). Superordinate goals versus superordinate identity as bases of intergroup cooperation,” in D. Capozza and R. Brown (Eds.), *Social Identity Processes*. London: Sage.
- Brewer, M. B. (2001). The many faces of social identity: Implications for political psychology. *Political Psychology*, 22, 115–125.
- Brewer, M. B. (2007). The importance of being “we”: Human nature and intergroup relations. *American Psychologist*, 62, 728–738.

- Brighton, S. (2007). British Muslims, multiculturalism and UK foreign policy: "Integration" and "cohesion" in and beyond the state. *International Affairs*, 83, 1–17.
- Brubaker, R. (1996). *Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the new Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cadinu, M., & Reggiori, C. (2002). Discrimination of a low-status outgroup: The role of ingroup threat. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 32, 501–515.
- Cap, P. (2007). *Proximization in the discourse of politics: Legitimizing the 'war-on-terror'*. Presented at the University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA.
- Cromwell, M. & Vogeleson, V.B. (2009). Nonviolent Action, Trust and Building a Culture of Peace. In J. De Rivera (Ed.), *Handbook on Building Cultures of Peace*. New York: Springer.
- De Rivera, J. (2004). Assessing the basis for a culture of peace in contemporary societies. *Journal of Peace Research*, 41, 531–548.
- Eliade, M. (1998). *Myth and reality*. Waveland Press Inc.
- Esch, J. (2010). Legitimizing the 'war on terror': Political myth in official-level rhetoric. *Political Psychology*, 31(3), 357–391.
- Esses, V. M., Dovidio, J. F., Jackson, L. M., & Armstrong, T. L. (2001). The immigration dilemma: The role of perceived group competition, ethnic prejudice, and national identity. *Journal of Social Issues*, 57, 389–412.
- Esses, V. M., Haddock, G., & Zanna, M. P. (1993). Values, stereotypes, and emotions as determinants of intergroup attitudes" in D. M. Mackie, & D. L. Hamilton (Eds), *Affect, cognition, and stereotyping: Interactive processes of group perceptions*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Fischer, P., Greitemeyer, T., & Kastenmüller, A. (2007). What do we think about Muslims? The validity of Westerners' implicit theories about the associations between Muslims' religiosity religious identity, aggression potential, and attitudes toward terrorism. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 10, 373–382.
- Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), 167–191.
- Gaunt, R., Leyens, J. P., & Demoulin, S. (2002). Intergroup relations and the attribution of emotions: Control over memory for secondary emotions associated with ingroup or outgroup. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 38, 508–514.

- Gaunt, R., Leyens, J. P., & Sindic, D. (2004). Motivated reasoning and the attribution of emotions to ingroup and outgroup. *International Review of Social Psychology*, 17, 5–20.
- Gellner, E. (1994). “Nationalism and modernization,” in J. Hutchinson and A. Smith (Eds.), *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gurr, T. R. (1970). *Why men rebel*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Gurr, T. & Harff, B. (1994). *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (2nd ed). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Hagendoorn, L., Linssen, H., Rotman, D., & Tumanov, S. (1996). *Russians as Minorities in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Kazakhstan* Proceedings from the International Political Science Association Conference, Boone, NC, USA.
- Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 10, 252–264.
- Heider, F. (1958). *The psychology of interpersonal relations*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Herz, J. (1950). Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma. *World Politics*, 2, 157–180.
- Hogg, M. A. (2000). Social identity and social comparison,” in J. Suls and L. Wheeler (Eds.), *Handbook of social comparison: Theory and research*. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Hogg, M. A. (2007). “Uncertainty-identity theory,” in M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology*. San Diego, CA: Elsevier Academic Press.
- Hogg, M. A., & Haines, S. C. (1996). Intergroup relations and group solidarity: Effects of group identification and social beliefs on depersonalized attraction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70, 295–309.
- Hornsey, M. J. (2008). Social identity theory and self-categorization theory: A historical review. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 2, 204–222.
- Horowitz, D. L. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in conflict*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Jervis, R. (1976). *Perception and misperception in world politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. *World Politics*, 40, 167–214.
- Jetten, J. & Spears, R. (2004). The divisive potential of differences and similarities: The role of intergroup distinctiveness in intergroup differentiation. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 14, 203–241.

- Jetten, J., Spears, R., & Postmes, T. (2004). Intergroup distinctiveness and differentiation: A meta-analytic integration. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *86*, 862–879.
- Johnson, D., Terry, D. J., & Louis, W. R. (2005) Perceptions of the intergroup structure and anti-Asian prejudice among White Australians. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *8*, 53–71.
- Jones, E. E. & Harris, V. A. (1967). The attribution of attitudes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *3*, 1–24.
- Jost, J. T. & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false consciousness. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *33*(1), 1–27.
- Iain, W. & Smith, H. H. (Eds.) (2001). *Relative deprivation: Specification, development and integration*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Korostelina, K. V. (2019). The normative function of national historical narratives: South Korea perceptions of relations with Japan. *National Identities*, *21*(2), pp. 171–189.
- Korostelina, K. V. (2013). *Constructing Narrative of Identity and Power: Self-imagination in a Young Ukrainian Nation*, New York, NY: Lexington
- Korostelina, K. V. (2012). (Editor) *Forming a Culture of Peace: Reframing Narratives of Intergroup Relations, Equity, and Justice*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan
- Korostelina, K. V. (2007). *Social Identity and Conflict*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lake, D. & Rothchild, D. (1998). *The international spread of ethnic conflict: Fear, diffusion, and escalation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Levine, R. A. & Campbell, D. T. (1972). *Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior*. New York: John Wiley.
- Leyens, J. P., Paladino, M. P., Rodriguez, R. T., Vaes, J., Demoulin, S. & Rodriguez, A. P. (2000). The emotional side of prejudice: The attribution of secondary emotions to ingroups and outgroups. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *4*, 186–197
- Louis, W. R., Duck, J. M., Terry, D. M., Schuller, R. A., & Lalonde, R. N. (2007). Why do citizens want to keep refugees out? Threats, fairness and hostile norms in the treatment of asylum seekers. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *37*, 53–73.
- Mazlish, B. (1981). The next ‘next assignment’: Leader and led, individual and group. *The Psychohistory Review*, *9*(3), 214–237.

- McFarland, S. G. (2005). On the eve of war: Authoritarianism, social dominance, and American students' attitudes toward attacking Iraq. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *31*(3), 360–367.
- Michael J. A., Wohl, M. J. A., Nyla, R., Branscombe, N. & McVicar, D.N. (2001). "One day we might be no more": Collective angst and protective action from potential distinctiveness loss. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *41*, 289–300.
- Musgrove, L., & McGarty, C. (2008). Opinion-based group membership as a predictor of collective emotional responses and support for pro- and anti-war action. *Social Psychology*, *39*, 37–47.
- Neisser, U. (1967). *Cognitive psychology*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Nicholson, H. (2014). Social identity processes in the development of maximally counterintuitive theological concepts: Consubstantiality and no-self. *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, *82*(3), 736–770.
- Noor, M., Brown, R., Gonzalez, R., Manzi, J., & Lewis, C. A. (2008). On positive psychological outcomes: What helps groups with a history of conflict to forgive and reconcile with each other. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *34*, 819–832.
- Quillian, L. (1995). Prejudice as a response to perceived group threat: Population composition and anti-immigrant and racial prejudice in Europe. *American Sociological Review*, *60*, 586–611.
- Overing, J. (1997). The role of a myth: An anthropological perspective" in G. A. Hosking and G. Scöpflin (Eds.), *Myths & nationhood*. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.
- Pettigrew, T. F. (2015). Samuel Stouffer and relative deprivation. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *78*(1), 7–24.
- Pettigrew, T. F. & Tropp, L. (2011). *When groups meet: The dynamics of intergroup contact*. New York: Psychology Press.
- Posen, B. (1993). The security dilemma and ethnic conflict. *Survival*, *35*, 27–47.
- Reynolds, K. J., Turner, J. C., & Haslam, S. A. (2000). When are we better than them and they worse than us? A closer look at social discrimination in positive and negative domains, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *78*, 64–80.
- Richards, H. & Swanger, J. (2009). Culture Change: A Practical Method with a Theoretical Basis. In J. De Rivera (Ed.) *Handbook on Building Cultures of Peace*. New York: Springer.

- Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process“ in L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*. New York: Academic Press.
- Rothbart, D. & Korostelina, K. V. (2006). *Identity, morality and threat*. Lexington, MA: Lexington.
- Sears, D. O., & Henry, P. J. (2003). The origins of symbolic racism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 85, 259–275.
- Schopflin, G. (1997). The functions of myth and taxonomy of myths“ in G. A. Hosking and G. Scöpflin (Eds.), *Myths & nationhood*. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.
- Sherif, M. (1966). *Group Conflict and Cooperation: Their Social Psychology*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Sherif, M. & Sherif, C. (1953). *Group in Harmony and Tension*. New York: Harper.
- Shin, J. Y. (2018). Relative deprivation, satisfying rationality, and support for redistribution. *Social Indicators Research*, 140(1), 35–56.
- Sibley, C. G. & Duckitt, J. (2010). The ideological legitimization of the status quo: Longitudinal tests of a social dominance model. *Political Psychology*, 31(1), 109–137.
- Sidanius, J. & Pratto, F. (2001). *Social dominance; An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, A. D. (2009). *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach*. London; New York: Routledge.
- Smith, A. D. (2011). National identity and vernacular mobilisation in Europe. *Nations and Nationalism* 17(2), 223–256.
- Smith, H., Pettigrew, T. F., Pippin, G. & Bialosiewicz, S. (2012). Relative deprivation: A theoretical and meta-analytic critique. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 16, 203–32.
- Snyder, J. & Jervis, R. (1999). Civil war and the security dilemma” in B. F. Walter and J. Snyder (Eds.), *Civil wars, insecurity, and intervention*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Solomon, G. & Cairns, E. (2009). *Handbook on Peace Education*. New York: Psychology Press.
- Spear, J. (1996). Arms Limitations, Confidence-Building Measures, and Internal Conflict“ in M. E. Brown (Ed.), *The international dimensions of internal conflict*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Staub, E., Pearlman, L. A., & Hagenimana, A. (2005). Healing, reconciliation, forgiving and the prevention of violence after genocide or mass

- Killing: An intervention and its experimental evaluation in Rwanda. *Journal of Social & Clinical Psychology*, 24, 297–334.
- Stephan, W. G., Boniecki, K. A., Ybarra, O., Bettencourt, A., Ervin, K. S., & Jackson, L. A., (2002). The role of threats in the racial attitudes of blacks and whites. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28, 1242–1254.
- Strabac, Z., & Listhaug, A. (2008). Anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe: A multilevel analysis of survey data from 30 countries. *Social Science Research*, 37, 268–286.
- Strelan, P. & Lawani, A. (2010). Muslim and Westerner Responses to Terrorism: The Influence of Group Identity on Attitudes Toward Forgiveness and Reconciliation. *Peace and Conflict*, 16, 59–79.
- Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1979). "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict," in W. G. Austin and S. Worchel (Eds.), *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Monterey: Brooks/Cole.
- Taylor, D. M. & Moghaddam, F. M. (1994). *Theories of Intergroup Relations: International Social Psychological Perspectives (2nd ed)*. New York: Praeger.
- Turner, J. C. (1975). Social comparison and social identity: Some prospects for intergroup behavior. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 5, 5–34.
- Turner, J. C. (2000). "Social identity," in A. E. Kazdin (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of psychology, volume 7*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- UNESCO (1995). *UNESCO and a Culture of Peace: Promoting a Global Movement*. New York: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.
- Van Evera, S.. (1999). *Causes of war: Power and the roots of conflict*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Volkan, V. (1998). *Bloodlines: From ethnic pride to ethnic terrorism*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Warburg, B. (2010). Germany's national identity, collective memory, and role abroad" in E. Langenbacher and Y. Shain (Eds.), *Power and the past: Collective memory and international relations*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Wheeler, N. J. & Booth, K. (1992). The Security Dilemma" in J. Baylis and N. J. Rengger (Eds.) *Dilemmas of world politics: International issues in a changing world*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Wohl, M. J. A., & Branscombe, N. R. (2005). Forgiveness and collective guilt assignment to historical perpetrator groups depend on level of social

category inclusiveness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 88, 288–303.

Wohl, M. J. A., & Branscombe, N. R. (2009). Group threat, collective angst and ingroup forgiveness for the war in Iraq. *Political Psychology*, 30, 193–217.

Wohl, M. J. A., Branscombe, N. R., & Klar, Y. (2006). Collective guilt: Emotional reactions when one's group has done wrong or been wronged. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 17, 1–36.